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Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a
few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement
negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all
consolidated plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit
fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical
evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again.
Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership
control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a
single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to
enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at consumers’ (or here,
clients’) expense. Apprehensiveness should increase when defense lawyers are
repeat players too, as they are in multidistrict litigation. And anxiety may
peak when the circumstances exhibit these anti-competitive characteristics, but
lack regulation as they do here. Without the safeguards built into class
certification, judicial monitoring and appellate checks disappear. What
remains is a system that may permit lead lawyers to act, at times, like a cartel.
Basic economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets
can result in higher prices and lower outputs, and agency costs chronicle ways
in which unmonitored agents’ self-interest can lead them astray. By analyzing
lead lawyers’ common-benefit fees, the non-class deals that they design, and
the results they generate for their clients, this Article introduces new empirical
evidence that multidistrict litigation is not immune to market or agency
principles. It demonstrates that repeat players on both sides continually
*
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achieve their goals in tandem—defendants end massive suits and lead
plaintiffs’ lawyers increase their common-benefit fees. But this exchange may
result in lower payouts to plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims
processing, or more coercive plaintiff-participation measures in master
settlements.
These circumstances warrant regulation. Even though judges entrench
and enable repeat players, they are integral to the solution. By tinkering with
selection and compensation methods and instilling automatic remands after
leaders negotiate master settlements, judges can capitalize on competitive
forces already in play. Tapping into the vibrant rivalries within the plaintiffs’
bar allows judges to use dynamic market solutions to remap the existing
regulatory landscape by invigorating competition and playing to attorneys’
adversarial strengths.
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INTRODUCTION
Clients are people, not inventories. But their claims are often
“sold” through referring attorneys and warehoused like commodities
by the high-end plaintiffs’ lawyers who control multidistrict
litigations. As in class actions, judicially appointed lead lawyers
dominate settlement discussions. By consolidating control in the
hands of a few lawyers and giving those attorneys negotiating power
over all the claims pending before the transferee court, leadership is
able to both credibly threaten the defendant with significant exposure
and promise some degree of holistic closure. If lead lawyers can
conscript individual plaintiffs’ attorneys into consenting to a deal that
allows those attorneys to cash in on their fees only by settling their
entire client list, then the defendant will receive something of value
that only such a monopoly can offer.
Nevertheless, as in any monopoly, the downside may well be
that leadership receives higher common-benefit fees for reduced
outputs.1 Common-benefit fees are akin to the price that a monopoly
charges for goods or services. And it’s clear that even less frequent
repeat players in leadership roles fare quite well as evidenced by some
of their lavish lifestyles—some have appeared in The Real Housewives
of Beverly Hills and in magazine spreads alongside yachts and private
planes.2 Common-benefit fees alone—without the accompanying
contingent fees—have ranged from $4 million to over $356 million.3
What is less clear, however, is how the plaintiffs fare—the
consumers, so to speak. Not all plaintiffs’ claims are created equal.4 If
leadership’s influence is unchecked, it’s possible that lead attorneys
could secure generous common-benefit fees for themselves, while
generating suboptimal outcomes for some or all claimants. It is here
that a significant departure from the class-action baseline emerges,

1.
Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003).
2.
Amanda Bronstad, With a Smooch, Tom Girardi Makes Debut on ‘Real Housewives,’
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202745063522/With-aSmooch-Tom-Girardi-Makes-Debut-on-Real-Housewives?slreturn=20160912185720
[https://perma.cc/SSR6-SFPE]; Richard Johnson, Perry Weitz is Living the Lavish Life, PAGE SIX
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://pagesix.com/2015/01/30/perry-weitz-is-living-the-lavish-life/ [https://perma
.cc/Q45G-HSLD]. Perry Weitz appeared only once in the dataset (Fosamax), though his law firm
had attorneys in ten leadership positions; Tom Girardi was a leader in three multidistrict
proceedings (BPA, Yasmin/Yaz, and Nexium).
3.
Infra tbl.3.
4.
The scholarly literature is rife with such examples. The interested reader, however,
might begin with Nagareda, supra note 1, at 166 (pointing out sources of variance in the
determination of damages, such as plaintiff friendly jurisdictions).
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for without certification, multidistrict proceedings lack the judicial,
competitive-market, and institutional checks that can help safeguard
and legitimize class outcomes.
Self-dealing settlement terms and collusive behavior have been
well documented in class actions even though classes require
extensive regulation throughout the proceedings.5 In Rule 23(b)(3)
classes, because only class counsel stand to gain attorneys’ fees, a host
of competing attorneys who are otherwise boxed out of that fee award
have incentives to solicit and assist class members in opting out.
Appellate courts stand ready to reverse collusive deals and chastise
self-dealing attorneys.6 And even defendants occasionally serve as
watchdogs for class members when their interests align: they invoke
inadequate representation as a rationale against class certification
and then, when settling, may consider its existence to prevent the
class-wide settlement’s preclusive effect from unraveling.7
But even these safeguards crumble in non-class, multidistrict
proceedings. When transferee judges select lead lawyers, they rarely
attend to adequate representation, focusing instead on financial
means, expertise, and cooperation—factors that empower repeat
players but may stifle competition. And unlike class settlements that
require judges to ensure that they are fair, reasonable, and adequate,
judges have little say in “private” global deals that leaders design.
External competitive checks are likewise absent: the overwhelming
message sent by transferee judges is that leadership appointments—
and the lucrative fees accompanying them—are conditioned upon
cooperation and team play. So, even though plaintiffs’ attorneys are
assertive and ambitious, their calculated response may be to silence
their discord and achieve financial success by playing the long game.
Defendants are no help either, for finality hinges not on adequate

5.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23; e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2014)
(overturning a class settlement approved by the lower court because the settlement “flunked the
‘fairness’ standard by the one-sidedness of its terms and its fatal conflicts of interest . . .”);
Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming).
6.
E.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); Eubank, 753 F.3d at
729.
7.
E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 393 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing to an observation by the magistrate judge
that the defendant’s willingness to create a settlement fund, thereby reducing the amount
received by the plaintiffs’ counsel, resulted from a desire to avoid further litigation in related
state law claims); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 346 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving the
potential preclusion of an earlier class-action settlement creating a compensation program for
the plaintiffs that purported to resolve all claims based on the harm giving rise to the prior class
action).

72

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:67

representation and preclusion, but on convincing claimants to accept
the deal.8
Maybe these circumstances would be less troubling if they
affected only a few cases, but multidistrict litigation is mushrooming
in both impact and sheer numbers. These cases often attract sustained
media attention (e.g., General Motors’ ignition switch litigation),
which influences public perception. And from 2002 to 2015,
multidistrict proceedings leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine percent of
the federal courts’ entire civil caseload.9 Removing prisoner and social
security cases escalates that number to 45.6 percent.10 Many factors
surely contribute to that increase, but two pulling in divergent
directions stand out: corporations operate nationally (and
internationally), but recent congressional and judicial decisions have
hobbled the use of nationwide class actions, particularly when state
laws govern.11
In short, multidistrict litigation impacts the entire civil justice
system. Even though the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“the Panel”) centralizes factually related cases to promote efficient
pretrial handling only,12 the reality is that just 2.9 percent of cases
return to their original districts.13 As cases routinely conclude through

8.
Infra Part II.A.1.
9.
DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, at x
(2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MDL_Standards_and_Best
PANEL
ON
_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SXR-TGG8];
JUDICIAL
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT 1 (2015).
10. DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at x–xi. This number will likely
increase once the 2015 year-end statistics are publicly available.
11. E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a)–(b), 4, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4–6
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating federal jurisdiction over class actions, which
increases choice-of-law problems); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363–67 (2011)
(strengthening commonality requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a)). For a detailed
overview of these changes, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1855, 1860–66 (2015). The settlement class action in mass torts has, however, seen a recent
revival. E.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 448 (3d
Cir. 2016) (affirming approval of a class-action settlement for former NFL players); In re Oil Spill
by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112, 161
(E.D. La. 2013) (certifying a class of medical claims).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (pointing to legislative history indicating that the statute applies only to
pretrial stages).
13. Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil actions for pretrial
proceedings. By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions had been remanded for trial, 398 had
been reassigned within the transferee districts, 359,432 had been terminated in the transferee
courts, and 89,123 were pending throughout the district courts. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation—Judicial Business 2013, U.S. COURTS (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2013
[https://perma.cc/MZJ2CYB7].
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these proceedings, the lack of checks and balances to thwart selfdealing temptations becomes all the more startling and suggests that
regulation is warranted. Part I adds theoretical and empirical support
to that argument. It highlights evidence that a small cadre of elite
actors routinely occupies the most powerful positions, pinpoints the
institutional policies that promote monopolization, and describes how
players use their influence to create and entrench practices that serve
their mutual interests.
Part I’s point, however, is not that repeat players form an
actionable oligopoly, cartel, or monopoly under antitrust law. Instead,
antitrust and economic principles enter in two distinct, but
intertwined ways. First, like oligopolies where a few sellers control
most of the market’s output, repeat players occupy plaintiffs’
leadership positions across many multidistrict proceedings, as Part I
illustrates empirically, and a handful of those repeat players are
central to every proceeding.14 By designing and replicating beneficial
practices, as well as imposing social and financial sanctions on rivals,
repeat players may use cartel-like understandings and enforcement
mechanisms to disable other firms from competing and to make their
own next leadership appointment more likely.15 Second, once judges
appoint leaders in a particular multidistrict proceeding, those
attorneys control the litigation, usurping the traditional attorney’s
daily responsibilities. As such, lead lawyers monopolize decisions,
negotiation strategies, and settlement discussions, often in ways that
encompass even state-court cases. The deals they devise reduce
competition by tethering all attorneys’ financial interests together and
sometimes further diminish the demand for legal services by

14. Infra Part I.A.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as
Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817–18 (2011) (defining a cartel as “an organization of two
or more separate firms that coordinates output or price, [but] may coordinate other aspects of its
members’ behavior as well”); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (1969) (defining oligopolies).
15. See TIM FRAZER, MONOPOLY, COMPETITION AND THE LAW 9 (1992) (noting that
monopoly power can be achieved through unfair competitive techniques that prevent firms from
competing); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 1.2a (5th ed. 2016) (noting that
economists would label repeat players as “dominant firms,” not as “monopolists” due to the
existence of a competitive “fringe” of smaller competitors); Myriam Gilles, Tribal Rituals of the
MDL, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 178 (2012):
On this [hub-and-spoke] model, a principal reason why some lawyers recurrently
appear in MDLs is that they’ve managed to form, or join, fluid networks that are held
together through mutually beneficial arrangements that are only possible among
repeat players, where there is always a “next time”—a next MDL—in which a favor
can be repaid, or a threat can be carried out;
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 584–90, 593–600
(2004) (explaining how cartels use social sanctions).
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restricting attorney advertising. Without regulation, this consolidated
control may tempt plaintiffs’ leadership to collude with defense
attorneys in ways that hurt plaintiffs.
Monopolistic power over individual proceedings carries an
inherent potential for abuse.16 It is here that classic principal-agent
concerns over agents’ self-dealing tendencies converge with market
theory. Well-established economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets can result in higher prices and lower outputs
that harm consumer welfare.17 In principal-agent terms, the worry is
that agents may bargain for higher common-benefit fees in return for
selling out their principals—perhaps in the form of reduced payouts to
plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims processing, or more
coercive participation measures.
Accordingly, Part II builds on Part I’s evidence of repeat play to
shine fresh empirical light onto the settlements those players design.
It shows that multidistrict litigation is not immune to agency or
market principles. Analyzing the non-class settlements that occurred
within an original dataset built from all product-liability and salespractices multidistrict litigations pending as of May 2013, I identified
provisions that one might argue principally benefit the attorneys and
not the litigants, such as those that compensate lead lawyers or
generate closure for defendants. One theme emerged from this
exercise: the outcomes seem to favor repeat agents. They achieved
their goals time and again in concert—defendants gained finality, and
lead lawyers increased their fees. They accomplished both by
marrying individual lawyers’ attorneys’ fees to all their clients’
willingness to settle; if too few clients settled, then the deal would
collapse. This allowed defendants to receive closure, plaintiffs’
leadership to receive common-benefit fees, and individual attorneys to
receive their cut of the contingency fee.
This win-win-win may not extend to plaintiffs even though the
main goal of personal injury suits is to compensate them—not to
resolve a big case. To take but one example, in the Propulsid
litigation, 6,012 plaintiffs traded their lawsuit for the settlement
process. Yet, only thirty-seven of them (0.6 percent) recovered any
money through the rigorous physician-controlled settlement process,
16. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“[Monopolistic power] like all power . . . is laden with the possibility of abuse; because it
encourages sloth rather than the active quest for excellence; and because it tends to damage the
very fabric of our economy and our society, monopoly power is ‘inherently evil.’ ” (quoting United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953))).
17. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 13–19 (1970) (showing how monopolies can lead to market inefficiencies).
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and they received little more than $6.5 million in total.18 Yet, the court
awarded lead lawyers over $27 million in common-benefit fees based
on an $87 million-dollar fund,19 the bulk of which reverted back to the
defendant.20
Whether lead lawyers trade finality for enhanced commonbenefit fees and whether this uniformly comes at an unacceptable cost
to plaintiffs is impossible to decipher given how few comparisons exist.
It is also besides the point. The point is not to demonstrate a causal
relationship, to reveal explicit collusion, or even to claim that repeat
players are inherently bad. Rather, the point is that self-interest can
take over if left unchecked, and no checks exist.
As such, Part III shifts from Part II’s question of why we
should regulate to how. Over the years, academics have proposed
various monitoring solutions, each with its own merits and drawbacks.
First, clients might monitor, much as they do in individual suits. But
lawyers in large multidistrict litigations often represent hundreds of
clients, making tailored client communication difficult. While judges,
special officers, and even lawyers can empower clients to interact,21
share information, form groups, and even govern themselves,22
collective-action problems may persist without intervention. Moreover,
doctrinal confusion among courts and the bar over ethical obligations
in aggregate settlements undermines the enforcement threat of
attorney malpractice suits.23
Second, courts might embrace class actions and let judges
police misconduct.24 Acting as a fiduciary for absent class members,

18. Infra note 294 and accompanying text.
19. Infra note 295 and accompanying text.
20. Infra notes 115 and 120 and accompanying text.
21. See Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the
Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727, 730 (2008) (advocating for the use of the internet in facilitating
class interaction); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 394–95 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 (2012).
22. I have expanded upon this idea elsewhere. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating
Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011). Judge Weinstein has
written extensively in this area as well. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATIONS 57–61 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 469, 542–49 (1994).
23. See Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–304 (2015) (illustrating doctrinal confusion).
24. E.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 527–28 (“Another
direction might be to consider judicial approval of class settlement and fees . . . .”); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 831, 834 (2002) (arguing that courts should take a more active role in class action
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the judge substitutes judicial wisdom for individual autonomy. While
retrofitting class actions to non-class aggregation via “quasi-class
actions” is problematic,25 courts could theoretically revive plenary
class actions26 or certify a defendant’s uniform conduct toward
plaintiffs as an issue class.27 Though judges appear increasingly
comfortable with issue classes, plaintiffs’ lawyers rarely propose them;
if they lose the issue-class trial, then issue preclusion prevents them
from relitigating, and, even if they win (unless the win prompts the
defendant to settle), there is still no common fund from which to
collect attorneys’ fees.28
Finally, looking outside the traditional litigation context, thirdparty financiers might monitor lead lawyers. If plaintiffs assigned a
financier a stake in their lawsuit as the contingent fee does now and,
in exchange, the financier funded the suit on a non-recourse basis,
then the financier would become a super stakeholder akin to
institutional lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.29 As sizeable
and sophisticated monitors, these funders might help manage
principal-agent problems by unbundling attorneys’ competing roles as
investors and advisors. They might likewise become repeat players.
Just as the NAACP, ACLU, and unions counteract the typical
disadvantages one-shot plaintiffs face by aggregating interests and
resources, a third-party financier could monitor and discipline lawyers
by ending relationships with certain law firms, for example.30 The
more difficult question, however, is how to ensure that financiers do

litigation). For a perspective that plays to the strengths of judges and the needs of claimants, see
Resnik et al., supra note 21.
25. The Principles suggest that issue classes might “more closely approximate
restitutionary principles” than the infamous “quasi-class action.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.09 reporter’s notes on cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
26. This would require the Supreme Court to reverse its trend toward stricter certification
standards.
27. For more on how this approach might work, see Burch, supra note 11, at 1871–90.
28. Id. at 1905–16; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financing Issue Classes: Benefits and
Barriers to Third-Party Funding, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 889 (examining the possible role of thirdparty financing in incentivized issue class trials).
29. For more on this proposal, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1291–1300 (2012).
30. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13, 37–38
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (suggesting that organizing one shotters into
repeat players might prove advantageous). Financiers, like other organizations, will have their
own agenda. See e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512–15 (1976) (arguing that some
civil rights lawyers have failed to put the needs of their clients ahead of their own idealistic legal
objectives).
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not turn into toll collectors who extract additional rents from
plaintiffs.31
While each of these potential monitors—clients, judges, and
third-party financiers—promises to alleviate some agency concerns,
they all share one principal deficit: information barriers. Judges might
want to appoint leaders who collectively represent claimants’ diverse
composition, but without the adversarial airing of potential conflicts
they lack the knowledge to do so. Claimants might push for selfgovernance, but they need sophisticated legal advice to understand
why their best interests may not align. And financiers—who may have
access to the requisite facts and law—may represent only a fraction of
the claimants.
Enter competition. By drawing on the vibrant rivalries within
the plaintiffs’ bar, judges can use market solutions to remap the
existing regulatory landscape without rule amendments or legislation.
In a somewhat related vein, Professors Charles Silver and Geoffrey
Miller have proposed an incentive-based approach where judges
appoint a plaintiffs’ management committee comprised of attorneys
with the largest client inventory, and those attorneys then pick,
compensate, and monitor the lawyers performing the common-benefit
work.32 Relying on plaintiffs’ attorneys shifts power away from the
judge, a move they explain by noting, “[J]udges have compromised
their independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest,
intimidated attorneys, turned a blind eye to ethically dubious
behavior, and weakened plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives to serve clients
well.”33 To be sure, judges can be part of the problem. But they can
become part of the solution as well. Although Silver and Miller’s
proposal overcomes information asymmetries, the concern is that it
may reward lawyers who “purchase” referrals that include
undifferentiated (and often weak) claims, further entrench repeat
players, and allow inadequate representation to persist particularly
for plaintiffs with idiosyncratic claims.
Accordingly, Part III offers a different approach. Educating
judges and encouraging them to implement four key innovations can
incentivize those with the greatest access to information—other
plaintiffs’ lawyers—to police the monopoly when it threatens to wield
its power in self-serving ways. First, judges should reject consensus
31. Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 581 (2014) (“[O]ne of the few veritable truths of
life is that every gatekeeper in life will at some point become a toll collector.”).
32. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 111 (2010).
33. Id.
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slates for leadership positions and use a competitive selection process
where attorneys openly jockey to hold the leadership’s monopoly
power. Competing for the market, that is, competing to become the
monopoly, may produce some of the same benefits of open market
competition,34 particularly if attorneys can confidentially air objections
about one another to a special master. Second, issuing an order that
presumptively adds (or replaces) lead lawyers with challengers who
successfully demonstrate the presence of unaddressed structural
conflicts of interest incentivizes those selected to remedy inadequaterepresentation concerns quickly.35 It likewise maximizes the payoff for
outside challengers, making it more profitable to compete and
discipline leaders than to play the long game in hopes of receiving
common-benefit work or leadership roles.
While the first two proposals infuse competition into leadership
selection, the latter two revamp compensation methods and external
safeguards. Thus, the third proposal urges judges to compensate lead
lawyers based on a percentage of the benefit they actually confer on
claimants—not a set percentage of the fund. This promotes fidelity by
realigning common-benefit fees with basic contingent-fee principles:
the better claimants fare, the better leadership fares. Quantum meruit
principles can also invigorate state-court competition over claims that
are not exclusively federal by replacing flat fees with tailored pricing
packages for state litigants who need access to some (but not all)
common-benefit work, and rewarding state lawyers whose efforts
benefit all claimants.
Finally, issuing a standing order that automatically
recommends the Panel remand non-settling cases to their courts of
origin after a global settlement can harness market forces to check the
leadership’s monopoly power.36 Automatic remands pressure lead
lawyers to design a deal that caters to multiple injury types by
threatening to destabilize their consolidated power and weakening the
settlement vortex, which currently gives plaintiffs only two choices:
settle or risk dismissal. Remanding puts trials back on the table,
returning one of plaintiffs’ most valuable bargaining chips. When
combined, these proposals tap into the robust rivalries within the
plaintiffs’ bar, inciting those who possess the most relevant
34. CHRISTOPHER DECKER, MODERN ECONOMIC REGULATION 37–40 (2015) (describing the
competition for the market approach); Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of
Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 178, 178 (1981) (“In the case of contestable
markets, potential entry or competition for the market disciplines behavior almost as effectively
as would actual competition within the market.”).
35. Structural conflicts of interest present a high bar. See infra Part III.A.3.
36. The Panel can likewise accomplish this unilaterally by amending its own rules.
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information and have the most at stake to hold those with
monopolistic power accountable.37
I. LEAD LAWYERS’ MONOPOLISTIC POWER
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Academics have long expected that more extensive repeat
players (as I use the term) who regularly encounter the legal system
will have different goals than those who don’t—“one shotters.”
Because repeat players encounter the system and its inhabitants
routinely, they may act strategically to maximize gains over a series of
cases, and play for “rules,” the short-hand term for standard practices
and norms that tip the scales in their favor in future cases.38
While major corporate defendants are repeat players in
multidistrict proceedings, they are not the only ones. Many plaintiffs’
and defense attorneys are likely to be repeat actors, too. This leaves
only one segment as probable one-shotters: the plaintiffs themselves,
and perhaps their individually retained non-lead attorney. Repetitive
play might advantage plaintiffs through their representative’s inside
knowledge. Or, repeat agents’ frequent interactions with one another
may tempt them to be more loyal to each other, to those who supplied
them with client referrals, or even to defendants who could pay them
handsomely in return for delivering finality, than to their own
clients.39
A. Empirical Evidence of Oligopolies: Repeat Play and Market Share
The first question then is whether repeat players exist and, if
so, whether they dominate influential positions across multidistrict

37. Although this Article focuses on multidistrict litigation, many of these proposals apply
equally to all mass, non-class settlements. Such settlements can occur in federal courts without
multidistrict litigation (toxic torts, for example) or in state courts.
38. Galanter, supra note 30, at 15.
39. Id. at 24 (“For the lawyer who services [one shotters], with his transient clientele, his
permanent ‘client’ is the forum, the opposite party, or the intermediary who supplies clients.”).
As plaintiff’s attorney Francis Scarpulla noted in supporting the “consensus” group in the
leadership appointment hearing, “this group works collegially and cooperatively with every
single person sitting at that defense table. I’ve known some of them for 45 years, as long as I’ve
been practicing. And I’ve probably been lead counsel in more cases than anybody in this
courtroom . . . .” Transcript of Proceedings at 40, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig.,
4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). When the judge then asked the defendants’
counsel about objections to the proposed plaintiffs’ structure, Jim McGinnis responded, “I been
[sic] practicing here for almost 34 years, have known all of the people on that side of the
courtroom for most of those years, and I can tell you with the utmost confidence that I’ve never
had a problem with any one of them.” Id. at 44–45.
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litigations. Influential positions vary but typically include lead
counsel, who heads the litigation; steering and executive committees,
which make key decisions concerning litigation strategy and
settlement; liaison counsel, who disseminates information to other
attorneys, calls meetings, and coordinates with counsel in related
state (and sometimes bankruptcy) actions; and occasionally separate
committee chairs, such as discovery and trial committees.40
Previous research has suggested that plaintiffs’ leadership is
rife with repeat players,41 but included little evidence on the defense
side.42 In a recent article,43 my co-author Margaret Williams and I
collected data on all judicially appointed attorneys in all productliability and sales-practice proceedings pending on the multidistrict
litigation docket as of May 14, 2013—seventy-three total
proceedings.44 The Panel centralized those proceedings over a twentytwo-year span, and collectively they include over 312,500 actions.
We confirmed that repeat players are prevalent leaders on both
sides, with repeat players holding 62.8 percent of the available
plaintiffs’ leadership positions; and seventy-three of 414 judicially
appointed defense leadership positions, or 17.6 percent. Of course,
defense lawyers are rarely judicially selected (the defendant chooses a
firm), so evidence of repeat play by law firm was more telling: of the
414 available leadership roles, attorneys from repeat-player defense
firms occupied 341, or 82.3 percent.45
We then conducted a social network analysis to reveal those
actors’ connections to one another and found that no matter what
measure of centrality we used, a key group of attorneys maintained
their elite position within the network.46 In fact, a small group of the
same five high-level repeat players (Richard Arsenault, Daniel Becnel,
Jr., Dianne Nast, Jerrold Parker, and Christopher Seeger)
consistently occupied the most powerful positions, and seemed to have
40. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
41. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71,
95–97 (2015); Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in
Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 149–60 (2012).
42. For a historical overview of repeat players’ development on both sides, see Samuel
Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional
Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1581–84, 1590–99 (2004).
43. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2724637 [https://perma.cc/KNY3-GBR6].
44. For a table of included cases as well as information about how the cases were
identified, see id. (manuscript at 20–22, 70–72).
45. A list of these firms appears in Burch & Williams. Id. (manuscript at 35).
46. Id. (manuscript at 24–33).
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far more impact on settlement design than did the total number of
involved repeat players.47
Consequently, while there is a vast market for legal services in
litigating tort claims generally, the market for representing claimants
in mass torts like products liability and sales practice cases can be
highly concentrated on both the plaintiff and defense side.48
Institutional coordination through multidistrict practices, referrals,
specialization, long-standing social networks, high litigation start-up
costs, and economies of scale winnow the pool of available lawyers.49
For those in this pool, leadership selection practices create further
entry barriers to leadership, allowing repeat actors to occupy those
roles across multiple multidistrict proceedings—much like an
oligopoly.
B. Institutional Practices Foster Rule Entrenchment
and Erect Entry Barriers
Judges’ leadership selection methods and institutional norms
combine to concentrate market share in the hands of a small number
of repeat players.50 And, once in power, repeat players may use their
advantage to influence, create, perpetuate, and enforce practices—
“rules,” for short. Playing the long game allows them to reap the
advantages those rules provide, standardize rules across proceedings,
and erect entry barriers for rivals.
1. Leadership Selection Methods Restrain Competition
Judges’ current methods for choosing leaders favor repeat
actors by encouraging private ordering and consensus.51 Consensus

47. Id. (manuscript at 41–42).
48. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1621–25 (explaining the highly concentrated
market for asbestos representation).
49. See id.; see also Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 387–90
(2000).
50. While multidistrict litigation has changed these conditions, they existed in class actions
too. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1618–20.
51. It is often impossible to tell which selection method a judge uses: attorney applications
are rarely on the judicial dockets, judges tend not to state their methodology on the record, and
attorneys’ behind-the-scenes efforts to coordinate may ultimately dictate the slate regardless.
E.g., Carolyn A. Dubay, Trends and Problems in the Appointment and Compensation of Common
Benefit Counsel in Complex Multi-District Litigation: An Empirical Study of Ten Mega MDLs
32–33 tbl.3 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (identifying the
procedures for appointing plaintiffs’ leadership that varied substantially in levels of generality
and observing “while the court may initially dictate a competition, consensus, or hybrid
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selection relies on informal attorney networks to identify necessary
leadership roles and pick their own leaders.52 Although private
ordering might be preferable for positions that demand
communication and camaraderie, such as liaison counsel, judges may
use this method to appoint the entire leadership slate.53 Somewhat
similarly, the hybrid process allows interim lead counsel to apply,
nominate executive committee members, and appoint subcommittees
while simultaneously permitting those who were not handpicked to
apply.54 Still, interim lead counsel influences most appointments,
which leaves only a few positions truly open to applicants.55
Alternatively, judges might invite submissions and choose among
them for all positions—a competitive process.
While it is simpler for judges to defer to private ordering, doing
so makes it difficult for new entrants to break into the leadership
market—despite their expertise.56 Private ordering favors attorneys
with long-standing business relationships, encourages attorneys to
curry favor with one another to secure lucrative positions in future
leadership hierarchies, and condones attorneys’ behind-the-scenes
political wrangling.57 Long before attorneys even lobby the Panel to

approach, ultimately the actions of the attorneys themselves will dictate the level of cooperation
in the development of a leadership slate”).
52. E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-md-01811-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18,
2007) (order appointing leadership counsel); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:04-cv-10981-PBS (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2004) (order granting motion to appoint
counsel) (appointing plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed slate). The first Manual for Complex Litigation
recommended this approach, though it changed course by the second edition and advised judges
to oversee the appointment process. Compare MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92,
4.53 (1982) (recommending attorney networks), with MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(SECOND) § 20.224 (1985) (recommending judicial oversight).
53. See, e.g., In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2012) (order concerning plaintiffs’ counsel organizational
structure at 1–2); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Counsel Organizational Structure at 2, 4–5, In re Biomet
M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16,
2012).
54. Letter from Aaron S. Podhurst and Harley S. Tropin to Judge Jesse M. Furman 2, In re
Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 1:14-md-02543-JMF (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).
55. E.g., Letter from Steve W. Berman, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, and Mark P. Robinson, Jr.,
to Judge Jesse M. Furman 4, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 1:14-md-02543JMF (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014).
56. See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 10–11 (observing how dominant firms might use business
relationships and governmental agents to block entry).
57. Supplemental Objection of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr. to Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Fee
Award, Ex. A (Application of the Becnel Law Firm, LLC as Per Pre-Trial Order No. 6(D)) at 2, In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-MD-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2011) (“I personally
called a meeting at Antoine’s Restaurant in New Orleans, at my expense, and invited every
lawyer who had a filed case or was interested in the litigation to meet and confirm leadership.”);
see FRAZER, supra note 15, at 11 (chronicling entry barriers).
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transfer cases to a specific location, players may make backroom deals
as to how many positions to create and who will serve in which roles.
In the Power Morcellator cases, for example, one of the lead lawyers
noted, “The leadership team was created before we even applied for an
MDL.”58 So, although that judge seemed to use an open application
process and had several applicants, one competing attorney withdrew
and another joined the consensus slate, prompting co-lead counsel to
remark, “Part of our effort over the last year was to get the team
together . . . [so] that we wouldn’t have to worry about competition. It
worked.”59
Even when judges select leaders, they stress applicants’
experience, cooperative tendencies, and ability to finance the
litigation.60 At least one judge has identified “team players” as “the
primary factor” in choosing leaders.61 To assess cooperation, judges
often request short applications and call other judges to ask about
uncooperative and disruptive attorneys.62 This too advantages lawyers
with pre-existing relationships who have a track record of working
well together.63
58. Amanda Bronstad, In a First, Women Compose Majority of MDL Committee, NAT’L LAW
JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742961283/In-a-FirstWomen-Compose-Majority-of-MDL-Committee?slreturn=20160826171813
[https://perma.cc/
CZY5-C9GU].
59. Id.
60. Dubay, supra note 51, at 39–40 tbl.6; e.g., In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-02326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (“The main criteria for PSC
membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a time-consuming project; (b)
ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in this type of
litigation.”); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20,
2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting initial
conference).
61. Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for Multidistrict Litigation
Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 392 (2014).
62. E.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:15-md-02672-CRB, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (pretrial order no. 2) (requesting leadership
applicants to include the names and contact information of multidistrict judges with whom the
applicant worked); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on
April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting
initial conference); Transcript of Proceedings on November 16, 2012 at 16–17, In re Biomet M2a
Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21,
2012) (“I know most of the judges who have your MDLs, and so I emailed them this week, gave
the list of names that had been submitted, and said, ‘Tell me anybody who I should not
appoint.’ ”). Even attorneys’ submissions sometimes suggest a litany of judges who can vouch for
the applicant’s reputation and “proven ability to work well with others.” Plaintiffs’ Proposed
Counsel Organizational Structure at 12, 25–26, In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2012) (leadership applications of
Mark Lanier and Douglass Kreis).
63. See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 11 (noting that long-standing business relationships and
barriers arising through legal practices can create barriers to entry for competitors).
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Stressing cooperation deters dissent by implicitly labeling it as
something that should not be rewarded. In lieu of dissent, judges
typically receive a chorus of support for informal consensus
nominees—not information about potential conflicts.64 Yet, because
§ 1407 requires only that cases share a common factual question,
plaintiffs’ best interests may not align.65 Without attorneys who are
willing to speak up on their behalf, adequate representation is at risk.
Of course, lawyers who work together frequently have superior
information about both conflicts among cases and one another’s skills
and temperament. So, allowing attorneys to object to proposed leaders
could help vet candidates. But the circumstances make this unlikely.
Repeat players will reveal that kind of information only if solicited
privately; speaking publicly diminishes their chances of receiving
common-benefit work or being appointed to a steering committee if the
objectionable candidate is empowered.66
2. Compensation Methods Impose Costs on Competitors
Ample opportunities also exist for lead lawyers to influence
both their own and others’ compensation since there is no firm
doctrinal ground to guide judges in awarding common-benefit fees.67
For instance, some judges institute fee-allocation committees
comprised of the principal lead lawyers.68 This means that at any
given time, leaders can set what amounts to pricing policies and
pressure rivals through their influence over fees in both that
proceeding and concurrent litigations.69
Judges tend to defer to leaders on common-benefit fee
practices, often implementing their proposed orders verbatim and
increasing fees midway through the litigation at lead counsel’s
request.70 Some transferee judges also insist that all attorneys with a

64. E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 59, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No.
4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (“And we are also supporting the Cotchett, Lieff
motion, but we are glad to work with all three firms.”).
65. For more information on these conflicts and a discussion of adequate representation
concerns, see infra Part II.D.2.
66. For more information on this aspect of sanctioning, see infra Part III.B.1.
67. Burch, supra note 41, at 102–09.
68. E.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2015) (case management order no. 71) (creating
a fee committee with five of eight members appointed by co-lead and liaison counsel).
69. See infra notes 268–273 and accompanying text; see also FRAZER, supra note 15, at 12
(noting that monopolies can affect pricing policies and use those policies to prevent market
entry).
70. Dubay, supra note 51, at 22–23, 54–55; see infra notes 194–199 and accompanying text.
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case in the federal proceeding sign fee-transfer agreements, which tax
an attorney’s entire client list to compensate lead lawyers—regardless
of where that client’s related case is pending.71 Attorneys participating
in the multidistrict proceeding have little choice in the matter; they
cannot conduct discovery on their own and must rely on leaders’
common-work product unless (one might think) they litigate solely in
state courts.72
But state litigants are not immune to federal common-benefit
practices either. Fee-transfer agreements and private settlements
often allow lead attorneys to expand their power structure beyond the
federal court’s jurisdiction to tax state-court litigants who benefit from
their efforts.73 In economic terms, this raises costs for competitors. As
some federal judges recognize their limited authority to impinge on
state suits, lead lawyers design settlements to collect common-benefit
fees from state-court plaintiffs who want to accept the deal—either by
including fees directly within the settlement or inserting provisions
that require settling plaintiffs to consent to the transferee judge’s fee
orders.74
3. Repeat Play Can Promote Efficiency and Economies of Scale
Although repeat players’ control across and within
multidistrict proceedings can produce costs, they can likewise
generate positive developments that further pretrial efficiency. When
asked, top-tier repeat players cite experience as their principal
virtue.75 Even basic antitrust doctrine recognizes that oligopolies may
sometimes include those “who merely by superior skill and
intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as
well.”76

71. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 4,
2005) (pretrial order no. 19 at 3); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is
Not, and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG., Mar. 2009, at 87, 90 (examining twenty-one
reported cases using common-benefit fees).
72. For more on fee-transfer agreements, see Burch, supra note 41, at 106–08.
73. See infra Part II.B.2.
74. See infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text.
75. Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL: Same Plaintiffs Firms Repeatedly
28,
2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=
Lead
Suits,
NAT’L L.J. (Sept.
1202738239700/Good-Ol-Boys-Club-In-MDL [https://perma.cc/9QJB-GPYK] (quoting Richard
Arsenault as saying, “A lot of deference should be given to experienced plaintiffs counsel who
have been in these wars and understand what kinds of teams they need to put together”).
76. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953)
(quoting the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 21 CONG. REC. 3146–52 (1890)); see
also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
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Repeat actors capitalize on economies of scale and their
acquired knowledge is imperative; it takes expertise to comprehend
the science behind injuries, understand the risks of various litigation
strategies, build the infrastructure that accompanies a multidistrict
litigation, and manage cases effectively. Certain firms are known to
intensively vet cases before suing, and their reputation may encourage
others to recruit clients and prompt claims to settle more quickly than
they otherwise might. Those settlement values may likewise reflect
repeat players’ knowledge about previous settlement amounts, which
helps prevent defendants from using informational asymmetries
against their clients.77
But there are many experienced lawyers and law firms. In
Vioxx alone, ninety-two law firms received common-benefit fees.78 Yet,
in product-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations, a mere
sixteen percent of the involved plaintiffs’ law firms occupied nearly
fifty-four percent of all leadership roles.79 And a small cadre of five
high-level repeat players consistently occupy the most powerful
positions.80 As such, two points emerge: (1) high-level repeat players
are not the only ones with experience—others can offer those same
advantages; and (2) transactions may have become too efficient,
without sufficient safeguards to ensure that the efficiencies further
principals’—not agents’—collective interests.
II. EMPIRICALLY AND ETHICALLY ASSESSING
THE DEALS REPEAT PLAYERS DESIGN
Multidistrict litigations riddled with repetitive play present
special challenges for transferee judges who must often manage them
without Rule 23’s class-action tools. The absence of clear adequate
representation guideposts and the class action’s policing power has
left judges looking to repeat players for guidance and advice about
what happens elsewhere. Without much external scrutiny, past
practices quickly become best practices, and experienced agents are
able to cite and replicate beneficial procedures in areas that affect
their financial remuneration. This leaves a lot of leeway for both
ingenuity and mischief, for without class certification, the resulting
(noting that monopolists cannot be condemned for developing the infrastructures necessary to
operate in the market).
77. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1599–1600.
78. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2011) (awarding
ninety-two of 108 law firms common-benefit fees).
79. Burch, supra note 41, at 96–97.
80. Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 41–42).
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settlements are private; they do not undergo Rule 23(e)’s judicial
vetting to ensure that they are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”81
This begs the question of who reaps the advantage of repeat
play—the regulars (attorneys and the defendant) or one-shotters (the
plaintiffs). Repeat plaintiffs’ attorneys’ monopolistic bargaining
authority adds to the conventional principal-agent concern that,
unless properly monitored, the agent may face routine temptations to
better herself at her principal’s expense. Since monopoly power also
creates a potential for higher prices and lower output,82 this could
mean higher common-benefit fees for attorneys and lower
representation quality (and perhaps less compensation) for plaintiffs.
Evidence as to higher fees and lower outputs is hard to obtain
in this context, for it is often shrouded by private, closed-door
settlement negotiations. Accordingly, to unearth some indicators that
might shed light on this question, I analyzed all publicly available
non-class settlements83 (thirteen settlements resulting from ten
multidistrict litigations84) that occurred within a dataset of all
seventy-three products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict
litigations pending as of May 14, 2013, as well as related media
stories, common-benefit fee awards, and docket entries from those
proceedings.85 Although thirteen settlements seems like a small
number, the proceedings in which those settlements occurred
collectively included 64,107 total actions—a number that does not
include the thousands of related state-court cases resolved through
the same settlements.86 In general, products liability and sales
practices should provide a representative sampling of multidistrict
proceedings, for they constitute well over one-third of all multidistrict

81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
82. FRAZER, supra note 15, at 9.
83. Because the focus is on the practices and norms that develop when judges lack Rule
23’s supervisory powers, I excluded (at least for this Article) the class settlements that occurred
within the data.
84. Three of those nine litigations—Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and
Yasmin/Yaz—each generated two settlements.
85. For a further description of the data, see Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript
at 20–21).
86. Using the most recent data available on the proceedings, the Pending MDLs by District
as of July 15, 2016 (or the earlier 2013 information where the proceedings were no longer
pending), the proceedings contained the following number of actions: Propulsid 474, Vioxx
10,320, Fosamax 1,141, Yasmin/Yaz 11,858, DePuy ASR 9,877, Biomet 2,607, NuvaRing 1,895,
Actos 5,111, American Medical Systems 20,231, and Zimmer Durom 593. MDL Statistics
Report—Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (July 15, 2016), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending
_MDL_Dockets_By_District-July-15-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLA8-FE9T].
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litigations (the largest segment by far),87 and up to ninety-two percent
of the actual cases pending within all proceedings on the multidistrict
docket.88 Consequently, the data, while limited, nevertheless provides
an interesting look into the deals that elite lawyers design.
Table A1 in the Appendix uses boldface type to designate the
reviewed settlements. It also lists the multidistrict proceedings within
the data that concluded with a holistic aggregate or inventory
settlement (thirty-one out of seventy-three), class-action settlement
(twenty out of seventy-three), and whether the non-class settlement
was publicly available (ten of the thirty-one non-class settlements
were public).89 Three of the ten publically available non-class
settlements had two settlements each, for a total of thirteen.90 One of
the publicly available non-class settlements (the American Medical
Systems litigation) is a partial settlement; it covers only the claimants
represented by two law firms, not all the pending claims. Because the
other agreements in that case were confidential, it is unclear whether
that settlement is representative of the others.
Using this same dataset, in Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, my co-author and I confirmed that the
repeat players are the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys who negotiated,
designed, and implemented the relevant settlements, as Appendix
tables A1 and A2 reflect.91 Table A2 shows which of the fifty-five
highest-level repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers (based on the total number of
multidistrict proceedings in which they held leadership positions) led
those ten proceedings. More importantly, one of the top five repeat
players participated directly in each settled proceeding’s leadership.
Considering this evidence alongside the social network of repeat
actors, it became evident that a relatively small group of high-level
87. CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION 12 (2012), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year
_Statistics-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6ZT-FCDE] (showing thirty-four sales practices
multidistrict litigations and seventy-two products liability litigations out of 291 total
multidistrict litigations).
88. Samuel Issacharoff, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Presentation at the Duke University
School of Law Mass-Tort MDL Program: Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics 3 (Oct. 8, 2015).
89. Ten proceedings are still actively ongoing, one case settled through individual
settlements, and one case settled through bankruptcy. Defendants successfully used Daubert
motions, summary judgment motions, and arbitration to resolve ten proceedings. Burch &
Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 15).
90. Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and Yasmin/Yaz each generated two settlement
agreements. And the American Medical Systems litigation settlement was a partial settlement; it
covered only the claimants represented by two law firms, not all the pending claims. Because the
other settlements in that proceeding were confidential, it is unclear whether it was
representative of the others.
91. Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 30).
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repeat players who occupied the most powerful positions had more
impact on settlement design than did the total number of involved
repeat players.
Because the previous article launched our factual and
empirical findings and linked the settlements to the network of repeat
players, this Part builds upon that work by considering the ethical
implications of the settlement provisions and adding new empirical
data on common-benefit fees and—to the extent available—client
outcomes. It focuses on settlement practices that might principally
benefit the attorneys, but not necessarily the litigants:92 (1) those that
induce claimants to settle and thereby create closure for defendants,
(2) those that reduce payouts to late-coming claimants who do not
have counsel as of the settlement date, (3) those that allow unclaimed
funds to revert to the defendant, and (4) those that compensate lead
lawyers.
Part A begins by considering how the first three categories
collectively benefit defendants by producing closure and returning
money initially earmarked for settlement. Part B then contemplates
judicial and settlement practices that allow lead lawyers to maximize
their profits through common-benefit fees. Collectively, both parts
suggest that repeat players—lead lawyers, defense attorneys, and
defendants—may benefit handsomely from the multidistrict process,
perhaps to the detriment of non-lead plaintiffs’ attorneys and
plaintiffs. By identifying potential cartel-like behavior among repeat
plaintiffs’ lawyers, Part C helps explain why non-lead attorneys
(particularly those playing the long game) do not object. To stifle
objections and dissent, leaders can credibly threaten social and
financial sanctions—some of which even have judicial support.
Finally, to the extent available, Part D introduces new empirical
evidence as to whether current practices lead to lower outputs for
plaintiffs. Much of the desired information on settlement payouts and
recovery rates remains private, but the available information suggests
that repeat players benefit from the settlements they design. If the
information that repeat players make publicly available so readily
appears to enrich them, the concern is that the gains unlocked in
exchange for delivering finality may well be leaders’ common-benefit
fees—not more money for plaintiffs.93

92. As others have explored, aggregation can create value, so one might argue that closure
provisions benefit plaintiffs. E.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–1201 (2013). I address this argument infra at Part II.D.
93. Commentators have often reasoned that the peace premium goes to plaintiffs. E.g.,
Rave, supra note 92, at 1185 (“Defendants want peace, and they are often willing to pay for it.
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A. Defendants Bargain for Closure and Returned Funds
Concluding the litigation (and reassuring shareholders)
becomes the end goal for most any defendant who cannot avoid
liability. Achieving that goal, however, is more difficult without the
ability to bind absent class members through class certification.94
Nevertheless,
the
circumstances
surrounding
multidistrict
proceedings produce favorable conditions for closure: transferee judges
are reluctant to remand cases, which keeps the litigation centralized;
coordinating suits and vesting power in the hands of a few attorneys
makes unified negotiation easier; and judges pressure the parties to
settle.95
Capitalizing on these circumstances, defense attorneys have
been able to reach mutually beneficial arrangements with plaintiffs’
leadership through a fundamental shift in settlement construction:
unlike traditional settlements between plaintiffs and defendants, all
thirteen deals in the dataset were agreements between lead lawyers
and defendants. These deals position lead plaintiffs’ lawyers as
settlement gatekeepers, for defendants will not make better offers to
others without the threat of trial; doing so would work against their
closure goal. These new deals then serve as a mandatory gateway for
anyone wanting to settle, and typically require non-lead attorneys to
become signatories alongside their clients. Accordingly, master
settlement agreements now aim some provisions at plaintiffs’
attorneys and some at their clients.
Provisions targeting participating plaintiffs’ attorneys push
ethical boundaries that require them to act in each client’s best
interest.96 In common parlance, these provisions are referred to as
follows: (1) attorney-recommendation provisions, which require
participating attorneys to recommend the deal to all of their clients;
(2) attorney-withdrawal provisions, which instruct attorneys to
withdraw from representing non-settling clients; (3) walkaway,
withdrawal, or “blow” provisions, which release the defendant from its
contractual obligations if too few plaintiffs settle; (4) case-census

Plaintiffs therefore may stand to gain if they can package all of their claims together and sell
them to the defendant . . . .”).
94. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1581–84, 1588; supra notes 45–49.
95. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399,
415–18 (2014).
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a), 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (requiring
attorneys to “exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice,” and
prohibiting representation without informed consent if there’s a significant risk that the lawyer’s
duty to someone else will materially affect the attorney’s advice).
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provisions, which require attorneys to register all their filed and
unfiled claims with the court such that the defendant can use that
number as the denominator for the walkaway percentage; (5)
latecomer reductions that reduce payouts to claimants without counsel
on the settlement date; and (6) reverter clauses, which allow the
defendant to retain unclaimed settlement funds.
In Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social
Network, we found that all settlements allowed the defendant to
renege if too few claimants abandoned their right to sue in favor of the
proposed claims-processing procedure.97 These walkaway provisions
ranged in their overall plaintiff participation requirements, with
eighty-five percent at the low end (Vioxx), and one-hundred percent at
the high end (Fosamax). All of the more recent settlements,
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy, NuvaRing, Actos, and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup,
reinforced walkaway provisions with case-census provisions. Eightyfour percent (all but Biomet and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, where the
judge required all plaintiffs to participate in the Zimmer settlement)
likewise included some form of attorney-recommendation provision.
On the more coercive end, Propulsid, Vioxx, Fosamax, and American
Medical Systems enhanced the likelihood of satisfying claimantparticipation rates by including both mandatory attorneyrecommendation provisions and mandatory attorney-withdrawal
provisions. Others, including Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy, NuvaRing, and
Actos insisted that participating attorneys use their “best efforts” to
meet the participation benchmarks. Three of the thirteen settlements
immediately reduced available settlement funds for plaintiffs that did
not have an attorney or who had not filed suit as of the settlement
date (“latecomers”), and four settlements permitted remaining funds
to revert back to the defendant.

97. For a comparative overview of these provisions, see Burch & Williams, supra note 43
(manuscript at 34).
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TABLE 1: PROVISIONS BENEFITING DEFENDANTS OCCURRING
WITHIN THE ANALYZED SETTLEMENTS
Settlement
Provision

Included in the
Following Settlements

Deviations and
Notes

Walkaway
Provision

All

Range in
participation
requirement from
85–100%

Case-census
provision

Yasmin/Yaz I & II,
DePuy ASR I & II,
Vioxx, NuvaRing,
Actos, Zimmer Durom
Hip Cup

Case-census
provisions provide
a denominator for
the walkaway
provision

61%

Mandatory
attorney
withdrawal

By plaintiffs’ attorney:
Propulsid I & II,
Vioxx, Fosamax,
American Medical
Systems
By defendant: DePuy
ASR I & II

DePuy ASR
allowed the
defendant to
expel noncompliant law
firms

53%

Attorney
recommendation
provision

Mandatory: Propulsid I
& II, Vioxx, Fosamax,
American Medical
Systems
“Best efforts”:
Yasmin/Yaz
I & II, DePuy ASR I &
II, NuvaRing, Actos

Best efforts
required
participating
lawyers to use
their best efforts
to convince
claimants to
settle

84%

Latecomer
reductions

DePuy ASR I & II,
Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup
Propulsid I & II, DePuy
ASR I & II

Reverter clauses

Percentage of
Settlements
Including the
Provision (of 13)
100%

23%
30%

Making deals with plaintiffs’ attorneys masterfully furthers
defendants’ end game in two ways. First, the agreements impose
uniform endorsement requirements on participating attorneys to
discourage them from “cherry picking,” a practice in which lawyers
settle most cases, but continue litigating those with the strongest
claims or most sympathetic facts. By requiring a high percentage of
plaintiffs to accept the settlement offer for it to take effect and
insisting that individual attorneys recommend that all their clients
settle (including clients who had not yet sued or who were pursuing
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relief elsewhere), defense attorneys essentially conditioned plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees on achieving their closure aims. A plaintiffs’ attorney is
either “all in” and would collect significant contingent fees from all her
settling clients, or “all out” and would have to spend significant
resources litigating individual cases—at least if she has too few clients
to trigger the walkaway provision. As such, recommendation
provisions alter the typical contingent fee model where an attorney’s
recovery increases alongside her clients’ recovery and instead ties
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ financial self-interest to each other and to the
entire claimant base. This shift also allows defendants to reach some
plaintiffs who are outside of the federal court’s jurisdiction, and others
who haven’t yet sued.
Second, these provisions reduce demand for legal
representation, for the settlement effectively becomes the only “game”
in town. Some deals demanded that plaintiffs’ lawyers withdraw from
representing non-settling clients and agree not to advertise for new
ones.98 Like oligopolists, leaders thwart competition and reduce
demand by using attorney withdrawal and recommendation provisions
to restrict the legal services market (at least for similar allegations
against the same defendant).99 When defendants threaten to abandon
the deal if too few plaintiffs participate, and participating attorneys
must recommend the deal to all of their clients and withdraw from
representing those who refuse, leaders can regulate the legal service
being offered and control a sufficiently large share of that market.100
These deals likewise inhibit existing rivals from competing, for they
are bound by ethical rules to convey settlement offers to their clients.
In this sense, master settlements can recreate bottleneck
problems where dominant firms raise competitors’ costs by obtaining
exclusionary rights;101 once defendants negotiate master settlements
with plaintiffs’ leadership, that agreement typically becomes the only
settlement option. Non-settling attorneys can avoid the bottleneck
only by taking state cases to trial. As such, the following sections
explain how these clauses evolved, how they operate in practice, how

98. See infra notes 143–183; text accompanying notes 166–168.
99. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.1 (explaining that “[a] cartel is an agreement
among otherwise competing firms to reduce their output to agreed upon levels, or sell at an
agreed upon price,” and that “cartel members must produce a sufficiently large share of the
product or service [such] that their decisions are not undermined by existing rivals who are not
cartel members”).
100. See id. (explaining the conditions for cartels).
101. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234–36 (1986) (explaining
bottlenecks).
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they restrict legal services, and how they flaunt—and sometimes
cross—ethical boundaries.
1. Recommendation, Withdrawal, and Walkaway Provisions
Impart Closure, Restrain Competition
Propulsid was the earliest available non-class settlement
within the data and is, to my knowledge, the first of its kind to
propose and implement non-class closure mechanisms.102 Propulsid’s
Steering Committee characterized its accomplishment as follows:
Never before in the history of multidistrict litigation, have counsel achieved a global
resolution of this proportion in the unique manner by which this Settlement Program
resolves the litigation without resort to complex joinder devices or Class Certification.
This remarkable approach to resolution of “mass tort” litigation promises to become the
template for similar resolution of future litigations of this kind.103

This statement proved prophetic, for, as Figure 1 below shows,
settlement designers replicated some aspect of Propulsid in every
subsequent deal within the data.

102. Similar closure mechanisms in the later Vioxx settlement have been the subject of
much ethical scrutiny. E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 267–68 (2011).
103. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 4, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).
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FIGURE 1: SETTLEMENTS IMPLEMENTING CLOSURE
PROVISIONS FROM PROPULSID
Mandatory
Vioxx, Fosamax, American
Medical Systems
Attorney recommendation
provision
“Best efforts”
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR,
NuvaRing, Actos
By Plaintiffs’ attorney
Vioxx, Fosamax, American
Medical Systems
Propulsid

Attorney withdrawal provision
By Defendant
DePuy ASR

Vioxx, Fosamax, American
Medical Systems, Yasmin/Yaz,
DePuy ASR, Biomet,
NuvaRing, Actos
Walkaway provision
Case Census Derivative
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR,
NuvaRing, Actos, Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup

Propulsid’s dealmakers engineered three closure provisions—
walkaway provisions, settlement bonuses, and a hybrid
recommendation-withdrawal provision. First, eighty-five percent of
death claims and seventy-five percent of injury claims had to enroll for
the settlement to take effect.104 Second, if one-hundred percent of nondeath plaintiffs enrolled, Johnson & Johnson would add a $4 million
“bonus” to the available settlement funds.105 Third, an “opt-out” form
accompanied the agreement even though all claimants had to
affirmatively “opt in.”106 Designed for non-settling claimants, this form
104. MDL-1355 Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Propulsid I Settlement]. The plaintiffs’ steering
committee represented about four thousand people, three hundred of whom allegedly died from
using Propulsid. Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement Over Propulsid Suit,
PHARMAWATCH: CNS, Mar. 2004, at 15–16.
105. Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 3.B.
106. Opt Out Form for Propulsid MDL Settlement, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. 2004), http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
propulsid/Forms/Opt%20Out%20Form%20Generic%20MDL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV3R-KWXK].
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authorized counsel to withdraw from representing the client (meaning
that claimants effectively opted out of representation),107 and later
became the template for more sophisticated attorney recommendation
and withdrawal provisions.
Negotiated in secret over twelve months by “The End Game
Committee” and then approved by a unanimous Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee, the settlement (“Propulsid I”) divvied claims into three
tiers—deaths, non-fatal heart attacks, and ventricular tachycardia
(fast heart rate) cases—each with required proofs for establishing
causation.108 Medical records went to a panel of two doctors, one
picked by the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, one picked by
defendants, plus a third for ties, who reviewed the records and
permitted or denied claims without explanation. If a claimant
qualified, the special master determined the confidential, nonappealable payment amount.109
Four years after the agreement, the physician panel had
deemed only eleven claimants eligible for compensation and rejected
1,356 claims.110 The settlement didn’t cover state cases or plaintiffs
who sued after February 1, 2004, which left around two thousand
claimants with pending suits and around five thousand who had not
yet sued.111 Yet, the court awarded lead lawyers $22.5 million in
attorneys’ fees, which was the precise amount they negotiated for
themselves with the defendant.112 No attorneys objected.113 Leaders
based their request on a percentage of the fund or a lodestar analysis,

107. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the unethical nature of these mandatory
recommendation and withdrawal provisions, see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 281–
92.
108. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 11–12, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).
109. Id. at 12.
110. Joint Report No. 62 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 2, In re Propulsid
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2008); Janet
McConnaughey, Two Propulsid Settlements; A Handful of Checks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 29,
2008.
111. Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State, Federal
Claims, 7 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 63 (Jan. 27, 2006). Earlier reports estimated
that 12,000 people had not yet sued at the time of the first settlement. Johnson & Johnson Unit
in Legal Settlement Over Propulsid Suit, supra note 104.
112. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2,
2005) (order); Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 19.
113. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2,
2005) (order) (“No objections were made to the Motion.”); Burch, supra note 41, at 108–09.
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using the total fund “deposited” by defendants, $87.3 million—not the
actual money paid to claimants.114
Eventually, only thirty-two of 4,245 claims submitted under
Propulsid I were eligible for relief—the confidential amounts of which
were filed under seal.115 Because relatively little money went to
claimants, the court and parties then transferred $8.3 million to
Canada’s Prepulsid Resolution Program and the same amount to
“charitable organizations.”116 After a joint motion by the parties, $40
million reverted to Johnson & Johnson, the defendant, which left $12
million remaining in the fund.117 So, as of July 31, 2012, claimants
likely received little more than $3.66 million combined.118
Although Propulsid I had not yet concluded, given the
continued need for finality with regard to the late-filed and state
cases, lead lawyers negotiated “Propulsid II,” a $15 million settlement
that mostly mirrored the first, but required ninety percent of death
claimants and ninety-five percent of personal-injury claimants to
participate.119 The physician panel found only five out of 1,767 claims
compensable this time, and Johnson & Johnson paid only $2.85
million from the settlement fund.120 Nevertheless, the leadership
requested and received an additional $4.1 million in fees with no
objections filed.121 The court also granted a joint motion to revert $5
114. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).
115. Joint Report No. 89 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 1–2, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).
116. Order Granting Joint Motion for an Order Authorizing Distribution of MDL 1
Settlement Fund, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La.
Nov. 30, 2009). The money went to Louisiana Health Public Initiative, even though claimants
were geographically dispersed throughout the country. Joint Report No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and
Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEFKWR (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012).
117. Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to Defendant
Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La.
Dec. 14, 2011).
118. See Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. July 31, 2012). The totals added in
the text are not, of course, in the Joint Report, but derived from numbers provided in that and
previous reports.
119. Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State, Federal
Claims, supra note 111; McConnaughey, supra note 110.
120. This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program, had
their claims extinguished, but did not submit claim forms. Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 2, In re Propulsid Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012).
121. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL
Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-
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million of the second settlement fund as well the remaining balance of
all funds to the defendant.122 As the litigation concluded, lead lawyers
requested and received an additional six-percent common-benefit
fund, which taxed settlements that occurred before the master
settlements and equaled $397,860.00.123
Two months after Propulsid II, the Panel centralized Vioxx
before the same judge.124 Its resulting non-class settlement has easily
been the most cited, discussed, and criticized deal within the data.125
Adapting closure and fee-related lessons from Propulsid, the
settlement offer combined two provisions—a mandatory attorneyrecommendation provision and a mandatory attorney-withdrawal
provision—to link individual attorneys’ interests to defendant Merck’s
closure goal. These provisions required each participating plaintiffs’
attorney to recommend the deal uniformly or not at all. If she
recommended it and the client refused, then she had to withdraw from
representing that client.126 If fewer than eighty-five percent of the
claimants consented, Merck could abandon the deal.127

KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see also In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012) (order) (granting motion for distribution of attorney’s fees
(Re: MDL Settlement Program II)). The only fee objections were those by firms objecting to their
own cut. E.g., Zimmerman Reed P.L.L.P.’s Response in Partial Objection to the Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee’s Motion for Distribution of Additional Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement
Costs (Re: MDL Settlement Program I), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-1355EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2012); Objection to the PSC’s Motion for Distribution of Specific
Attorney’s Fees Awards and for Expenses and Reimbursements (Re: MDL Settlement Program
I), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2009)
(filed by Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.).
122. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Oct. 3,
2012) (order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution program and
authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund and administrative fund
after all payments due thereunder have been made); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
123. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-1355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014)
(order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final Distribution of
Remaining Funds at 3, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D.
La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La.
Oct. 3, 2012) (order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution program
and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund and administrative
fund after all payments due thereunder have been made).
124. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2005)
(transfer order).
125. E.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 267–68.
126. Master Settlement Agreement §§ 1.2.8.1–3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement]. After some plaintiffs’
attorneys contended the settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to mean
that the attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s best interest. In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 395–97 (5th Cir. 2010); Alex Berenson, Some Lawyers
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These similarities are unsurprising given that both Vioxx and
Propulsid included many of the same lead plaintiff lawyers—Richard
Arsenault, Dawn Barrios, Russ Herman, Arnold Levin, and Chris
Seeger.128 Like Propulsid and Vioxx, Vioxx and Fosamax shared many
key players, too. Merck manufactured and distributed both drugs,
thus Bruce Kuhlik, Merck’s general counsel, and Ted Mayer of
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed represented Merck in each suit. On the
plaintiffs’ side, James Dugan II, and Shelly Sanford were lead lawyers
in both Vioxx and Fosamax, and Ashcraft and Gerel, LLP had
attorneys on both leadership rosters. Moreover, two law firms—
Murray Law Firm and Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty
& Proctor, P.A—had attorneys who served as leaders in Propulsid,
Vioxx, and Fosamax.
Consequently, it follows that the Fosamax agreement
replicated many Propulsid and Vioxx-like provisions: all attorneys
with participating clients had to become parties to the agreement and
recommend that their clients accept the deal.129 But the walkaway
provision in Fosamax differed from those in Propulsid and Vioxx.
Merck had two options if a single claimant or her counsel failed to
agree: (1) Merck could declare the agreement null and void, or (2) it
could reduce the settlement amount by however much the allocation
committee determined would have been paid to non-participating
claimants and their counsel.130 Merck did not activate its first option,
but the judge allowed numerous attorneys to withdraw from
representing non-settling claimants.131 These measures led to a
ninety-five percent participation rate four months after the

Seek Changes in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/20/business/20cnd-vioxx.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K8AN-WKWE].
127. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 11.1.
128. See In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2,
2005) (order) (Dawn Barrios and Richard Arsenault as State Liaison counsel; Russ Herman on
Plaintiff’s Steering Committee); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-MD-01355-EEFKWR (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2000) (pretrial order no. 3) (Russ Herman, Arnold Levin, and Chris
Seeger on Plaintiff Steering Committee); cf. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657EEF-DEK (E.D. La. May 22, 2009) (pretrial order no. 41) (Dawn Barrios on Private Third Party
Payor Bellwether Trial Committee); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657-EEF-DEK
(E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (pretrial order no. 6) (Richard Arsenault, Arnold Levin, and Chris Seeger
on Plaintiff’s Steering Committee).
129. Master Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1–2, 5, Exhibit C at C-15 (Certification and Joinder
of Counsel, Claimant’s Counsel), In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement].
130. Fosamax Settlement, supra note 129, ¶ 11.
131. E.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2014) (order) (allowing Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A. to
withdraw as counsel).
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settlement, which was likely later enhanced by granting Merck’s
unopposed Lone Pine orders—orders that impose evidentiary
production requirements on non-settling plaintiffs, sometimes with
little advanced notice.132 As colorfully described by the leadership,
Lone Pine orders are “a post-settlement mop-up procedure.”133
Closure mechanisms in the American Medical Systems Pelvic
Repair Systems agreement were strikingly similar to those in
Fosamax, Vioxx and Propulsid: once again plaintiffs’ attorneys had to
recommend the deal uniformly, secure releases from at least ninetyfive percent of plaintiffs, and “employ their best efforts to obtain an
executed Release from 100%.”134 If a client still refused, counsel had to
withdraw from representing her.135 Although the deal explicitly
purported not to restrict attorneys’ right to practice law, which would
violate Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 5.6(b),136
participating counsel agreed not to “actively solicit prospective Pelvic
Mesh clients via television, radio or website advertisement” and
represented that the submitted claimant list included all known
claims.137 Moreover, the special master overseeing the claims process

132. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2014) (order). Plaintiffs may be relying on common evidence produced by the lead lawyers, but,
when a plaintiff refuses to settle, a Lone Pine order might require a plaintiff to retain an
individual expert and produce her opinion within a couple of weeks. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No.
L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).
133. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2014) (order) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Defendant Merck’s Motion for Entry of Lone Pine Order at 7, In re Fosamax
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012)). Lone Pine orders
typically require non-settling plaintiffs to provide some evidentiary support for their claims to
avoid dismissal. Lone Pine, 1986 WL 637507 at *4; see In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 509 F.
App’x 383, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] Lone Pine order[ ] imposed certain discovery
requirements on such plaintiffs, including production of pharmacy and medical records, expert
reports, and answers to Merck’s interrogatories.”).
134. Master Settlement Agreement § II.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter Pelvic Repair
Settlement].
135. Id. §§ II.H, I.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to
practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2) (2000) (“In settling a client claim, a lawyer may not offer or
enter into an agreement that restricts the right of the lawyer to practice law, including the right
to represent or take particular action on behalf of other clients.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“In connection with the settlement of a
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice
law.”).
137. Pelvic Repair Settlement, supra note 134, § II.S.
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was the presiding judge in the New Jersey state-court Propulsid
litigation.138
Like all the other settlements examined thus far, the two
Yasmin/Yaz agreements (one for gallbladder injuries and one for
arterial thromboembolism “ATE” injuries) shared many features with
their predecessors.139 The closure mechanism in the Gallbladder
Settlement, however, was both novel and unorthodox. Even though it
was not a class action, it included an automatic-enrollment provision
that required non-participating plaintiffs to affirmatively opt-out.140 A
case management order—citing dubious judicial authority and
precedent according to Vioxx and Propulsid—reinforced the automatic
enrollment, notified claimants, and required them to either
affirmatively “opt-out” before the deadline or complete a claims
compensation package.141 Failing to do either resulted in dismissal
with prejudice.142 Two additional provisions fortified this closure
mechanism: a promise by the lead lawyers to “use their best efforts to
achieve sufficient participation,” and the defendant’s ability to
abandon the deal if less than ninety percent of all eligible claimants
(with cases pending anywhere) accepted.143 The Yasmin/Yaz ATE
Settlement lacked the mandatory inclusion provision, but replaced it
with higher participation thresholds and the same promise by
leadership to meet those benchmarks.144

138. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2325
(S.D. W. Va., May 28, 2014) (pretrial order no. 175) (appointing Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.)
as special master for private settlement agreements between AMS and certain plaintiffs’
counsel); cf. Jean Hellwege, State Court Rejects Propulsid Class; Plaintiff Lawyers Unbowed,
TRIAL, July 1, 2002, at 90, 90.
139. ATE Master Settlement Agreement, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Aug. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement]; Settlement Agreement, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone)
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Mar. 15,
2013) [hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder Settlement].
140. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, §1.01(A).
141. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Mar. 15, 2013) (case management order #60 at 2).
142. Id.
143. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, §§ 9.01, 9.02.
144. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, §§ 3.01, 3.02 (requiring 97.5 percent overall
participation, ninety-five percent of death and severe injury claims, and all eligible claimants
calendared for a trial or jury selection in state or federal court).
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2. Case-Census Provisions Yield Judicially Reinforced Closure
and Define the Relevant Market
To reach the entire spectrum of claimants (state, federal, filed,
and unfiled), more recent walkaway provisions include a new twist—
judicial reinforcement via census provisions. Settlement designers in
the Vioxx settlement,145 the DePuy ASR settlements,146 the second
Yasmin/Yaz ATE settlement agreement,147 the Actos settlement,148 the
NuvaRing settlement,149 and the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
settlement150 employed “registration” or “case-census” provisions,151
which involved jointly petitioning both the transferee judge and the
coordinating state-court judges for an order notifying claimants of the
deal and requiring them to register their claims—or face potential
dismissal—by a certain date.152
145. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 1.1.
146. Settlement Agreement, Art. 3, §§ 3.1–3.3, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 DePuy
ASR Settlement]; Settlement Agreement at art. 3, §§ 3.1–3.3, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
DePuy ASR Settlement. The 2013 DePuy Hip Implant ASR settlement was the first in the
dataset to use a registration provision. Less than two years after the original settlement,
settlement designers implemented the 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement, which extended the
original program deadline to cover around 1,400 revision surgeries occurring after the original
deadline as well as claimants who rejected Johnson & Johnson’s initial offer. Joint Status Report
Regarding U.S. Settlement Program, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2015); Jef Feeley, J&J to Pay as Much as
$420 Million More to Resolve Additional ASR Hip Implant Suits, 16 Class Action Litig. Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 210 (Feb. 27, 2015).
147. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 1.02.
148. Master Settlement Agreement § 1.02, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Actos Settlement].
149. Master Settlement Agreement § 1.05, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 4:08-md-01964RWS (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter NuvaRing Settlement]. The agreement also appointed
the judge presiding over the NuvaRing litigation as the Special Master. Id. § 5.01. Parties
appealing the claims administrator’s decision (BrownGreer) to the Special Master had to pay the
Special Master’s cost, which was fixed at $300/per dispute. Id. § 5.05.
150. U.S. Durom Cup Settlement Program Agreement § V.A., V.B., In re Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Zimmer
Durom Settlement].
151. The Pradaxa settlement was not publicly available, but the judge in that case likewise
issued a census order. In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2014) (case management order no. 76) (initial claimant
identification certification order).
152. E.g., In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29,
2014) (case management order) (supplemental census of claims); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement
agreement and deadlines); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Aug. 3, 2015) (case management order no.
77) (census of claims).
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All attorneys representing a single plaintiff in the issuing
courts had to register all related claims in which they had an interest
(broadly defined to include “any financial interest of any kind
whatsoever”) regardless of whether the claims were unfiled or pending
elsewhere.153 Noncompliance would prompt a show-cause hearing.154
Dealmakers then used the census to determine the total number of
claimants, which became the denominator for satisfying the
defendant’s walkaway right.155 As such, census orders define the
universe of claims and the relevant market for attorneys’ legal
services, as well as fortify plaintiffs’ leadership’s position at the
helm.156 But the census provision in the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
settlement carried added weight: the judge not only ordered all
plaintiffs’ attorneys to register all of their clients (regardless of where
those claims were pending), but also ordered all plaintiffs to
participate in the settlement and stayed the proceedings pending the
conclusion of the settlement’s mediation process.157
Both DePuy settlements further reinforced case-census
provisions and leaders’ control with uniform recommendation
requirements, which prevented participating attorneys from
“defecting.” First, signatory attorneys had to use their “best efforts” to
enroll their clients158 and “endorse enrollment” subject to their
independent professional judgment.159 Second, the agreement included
a “meet and confer” provision with the special master and the steering
committee, which lead lawyers billed as an opportunity to have
participation questions answered.160 But the subsequent clause was
more revealing. The special master could use that opening to decide
that a law firm or interested counsel “did not act in good faith in
connection with the informed consent process and participation,”
which allowed DePuy, “at its sole option,” to expel that firm or

153. Coordination Proceeding Special Title [Rule 3.550] Actos Prod. Liab. Cases, JCCP No.
4696 (Cal. Sup. Ct., May 7, 2015) (stipulation and order re census of claims and continuance of
status conference).
154. E.g., id.
155. E.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 3.02.
156. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 3.2 (defining market power and describing
mechanisms for maintaining market power, such as exclusion).
157. In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J.
May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
158. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement,
supra note 146, § 17.2.8.
159. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement,
supra note 146, § 17.2.8.
160. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.11; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement,
supra note 146, § 17.2.11.
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attorney’s other clients from the deal.161 So, rather than requiring the
attorney to withdraw, DePuy could expel them. But the result was the
same as in Propulsid: attorneys had to consider their clients as a
group—not individuals. So, the settlement’s obligatory disclaimer that
client recommendations were “subject to their independent
professional judgment” accomplished little.
Defendants are, of course, free to structure settlement offers
any way they like. They can even include provisions that force
plaintiffs’ lawyers to treat their clients as a group. There are, however,
some ethical principles that restrict this unbridled freedom. Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) states: “It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through the acts of another.”162 Unfortunately, this Rule has
proven too flimsy to be of much use. Courts and commentators have
differed substantially on how it applies to aggregate settlements,
which dampens the threat of potential disciplinary repercussions.163
3. Latecomer and Reverter Clauses Promote Finality, Inhibit
Advertising, and Return Funds
Two further provisions add to the possibility that repetitive
play and plaintiffs’ leadership’s monopolistic control may principally
benefit repeat actors: latecomer reductions and reversion clauses,
which allow unclaimed funds to revert to the defendant. Beginning
with the former, settlement designers in Zimmer Durom Hip Cup and
DePuy ASR experimented with a unique provision that reduced
payouts to claimants who were not represented by counsel as of the
settlement date.164 The idea was to inhibit the Field-of-Dreams
problem: creating a claims process can encourage attorneys and
claimants to emerge, file suit, and partake of the settlement. To
discourage this, these anticompetitive provisions immediately reduced
unrepresented claimants’ awards by twenty-nine percent and covered
two groups of people: (1) those litigating pro se and (2) those who
retained attorneys and filed suit after the identified date. As to the pro
se litigants, DePuy ASR’s designers explained that the reduction
simply discounted their payout to the same amount they would have
161. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement,
supra note 146, § 17.2.12.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
163. Baker, supra note 23, at 298.
164. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.4; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra
note 146, § 4.4; Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § III.A.2.e.
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received if they had to pay individual attorneys’ fees, but noted,
“[T]here will be an additional Court approved deduction for common
benefit fees and expenses.”165 The second group was even worse off, for
if those DePuy ASR plaintiffs wanted an attorney to help with their
claim, then they had to pay attorneys’ fees and common-benefit fees
out of their reduced award.
Latecomer reductions prompt two concerns. First, by
decreasing awards, they discourage attorneys from representing new
clients and run into ethical rules that prohibit counsel from restricting
their right to practice through settlements.166 To be sure, Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.6(b) is controversial,167 but even setting
aside the restriction on practice, latecomer reductions unfairly
penalize pro se litigants for representing themselves and assume they
would have received more had they retained counsel. To the extent
that settlement designers intended to discourage other attorneys from
advertising, collecting a last-minute client roster, and freeriding on
lead lawyers’ hard work, they taxed the wrong people. Requiring
dilatory attorneys to pay a scaled-up common-benefit fee makes sense
under a restitution theory, but the brunt of latecomer reductions fell
on clients—not attorneys. Moreover, restricting advertising and
reducing settlement awards (and thus attorneys’ fees) penalized and
thereby discouraged last-minute competition, which helps insulate
lead lawyers’ monopolistic power from challenge.168
Second, DePuy ASR’s leadership’s attempt to disclaim fiduciary
obligations to pro se plaintiffs by expressly stating that they “remain
Unrepresented Claimants” even if they “obtain assistance” from the
lead lawyers is dubious.169 While leaders lack an individual attorneyclient relationship with pro se litigants, their fiduciary obligations run
to all plaintiffs within the proceeding equally.170 Leaders apply for the
right to control others’ lawsuits. Allowing them to exert control
without incurring a corollary duty to represent plaintiffs loyally would
165. 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement Benefits Overview at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics,
Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2015),
https://www.usasrhipsettlement.com/Un-Secure/WebNews.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7UP-WLMU].
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
167. E.g., Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit NoSue Promises in Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 294 (2005).
168. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 295, 306–07 (1987) (discussing advertising punishments for cartels).
169. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.4; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra
note 146, § 4.4.
170. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt. a, 1.05
illus. 2, 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges
in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1987–89 (2011).
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permit attorneys to exploit plaintiffs to their own advantage.
Appointing them procedurally would likewise divest plaintiffs of
substantive, contractual rights they would have had if their own
attorneys retained control,171 and would thereby violate the Rules
Enabling Act.172
Ordinarily, leadership’s fees come out of a plaintiff’s attorney’s
fee such that the plaintiff is no worse off for litigating a case through
multidistrict litigation. And freeriding pro se litigants who profit from
leaders’ work should likewise have to pay common-benefit fees.173 But
diminishing pro se litigants’ award at the outset on top of requiring
them to pay common-benefit fees to the lead lawyers who disserved
them is different.174 Leaders can’t have it both ways: either they
faithfully fulfilled their fiduciary obligations by protecting those
claimants’ financial interests and should be compensated for any
benefit they conferred, or they did not and should receive nothing.
Had the court certified the litigation as a class action, latecomer
provisions would violate Amchem’s basic precept: by negotiating side
deals that paid their current clients more than class members, class
counsel would have inadequately represented the latter.175
In addition to the latecomer reductions, the DePuy settlements
contained reversion clauses: the twenty-nine percent taken off the top
reverted to DePuy, the defendant.176 In class actions, reverter clauses
often indicate collusion, can create perverse incentives to implement
restrictive claims criteria, and can undermine the judgment’s
deterrent effect.177 Yet, settlement designers in both DePuy ASR and
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (stating that clients are
entitled to representation free from any conflicts and must give their informed consent if
conflicts exist); see also Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary
Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833, 1836, 1838 (2011) (noting that by entering into a retainer
agreement, an agent owes a duty of loyalty to clients with respect to actions within the
representation’s scope and could be sued if she breaches her fiduciary duty).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (prohibiting procedural rules from abridging, enlarging, or
modifying any substantive right).
173. Burch, supra note 41, at 132.
174. For further arguments as to lead lawyers’ fiduciary obligations, see Silver, supra note
170, at 1987– 91.
175. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600, 606, 626–28 (1997).
176. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7; 2013 DePuy ASR
Settlement, supra note 146, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7.
177. Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.), 654 F.3d 935,
947–48 (9th Cir. 2011); Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 47 (D. Me. 2005) (noting
“the reverter clause and clear sailing clause raise a presumption of unfairness”); BARBARA J.
ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR
JUDGES 13, 20 (2005); Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV.
617, 631 (2010).
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Propulsid used them.178 When reversion clauses are paired with
stringent claims-filing procedures and attorneys’ fees are calculated
using the fund’s initial size—not claimants’ benefit—self-dealing
concerns increase.179 As Justice O’Connor recognized in the classaction context, allowing judges to base attorneys’ fees on a fund’s
sticker price would “decouple class counsel’s financial incentives from
those of the class, increasing the risk that the actual distribution will
be misallocated between attorney’s fees and the plaintiffs’ recovery.”180
This can, she explained, “undermine the underlying purposes of class
actions by providing defendants with a powerful means to entic[e]
class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the
class.”181 Without Rule 23’s regulatory safeguards, the practice is even
more troubling.182
In sum, Propulsid’s designers were right. Their deal did
become a template for future cases, and it was remarkable. But the
remarkable things about the agreement were the ways in which it
perfected the shift toward considering clients as inventories and
entities instead of individuals, flaunted ethical rules (ceasing to
represent non-settling clients seems to violate Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16, and attorney advertising restrictions risk
violating Rule 5.6(b)), and reduced competition.183
B. Lead Lawyers Bargain for Common-Benefit Fees
Propusid’s design likewise kick started a trend of expertly
wedding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interest in collecting fees to the

178. Supra notes 112–123, 176 and accompanying text. By contrast, no amount of the $56.9
million in the Yaz ATE settlement could revert to the defendant. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra
note 139, § 4.01(F).
179. In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 947 (“Moreover the settlement also contained a
‘kicker’: all fees not awarded would revert to defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund
or otherwise benefit the class.”); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting the questionable nature of allowing unclaimed funds to revert to the putative
wrongdoer); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:29 (5th ed. 2013) (“[B]ecause class counsel’s fees
may be pegged to the size of the fund made available (prior to reversion), a reversionary fund
may be a warning that counsel has undersold the class’s claims.”).
180. Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
statement respecting denial of certiorari).
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 112–123 and accompanying text.
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16, 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (terminating the
lawyer-client relationship and restricting the right to practice respectively); ABA Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at
284–92. See generally David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 923–34 (1998) (likening absent class members to entities).
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defendant’s closure goal: without convincing one’s entire client roster
to settle, the defendant’s required claimant-participation rate would
fail, the deal would collapse, and fees would disappear. Requiring
attorneys to become signatories and to treat their clients as an entity
means that attorneys’ financial interests are intertwined with the
deal’s success. For lead lawyers, the stakes are even higher. In
addition to their clients’ contingency fees, they stand to gain commonbenefit fees from the entire group.
To fund massive lawsuits, lead lawyers must front substantial
resources to cover things like expert and administrative costs and the
costs of taking depositions and creating document repositories. To do
this, they pool their money into a fund. As such, some common-benefit
payments are better viewed as reimbursing leaders for these costs. As
in any contingent fee case, when litigation proves less successful than
they’d hoped, recoveries may not cover those expenses.184 But in
successful litigation, when leaders settle their own cases, they (like
others) will have to pay a percentage of their clients’ gross settlement
proceeds into the fund. For leaders, that money will eventually
transfer from one pocket to the other at the same rate (unless the
judge awards them less of a common-benefit fee), but collecting
attorneys’ fees from other cases can generate significant income.
Because fees are judicially imposed, information about them is
more readily available. Table 2 includes information from the thirty
(of the seventy-three) products-liability and sales-practice
multidistrict litigations that concluded in non-class settlements
(either as inventory settlements or holistic aggregate settlements),185
even where the settlements were not publicly available. The totals in
the final row indicate the prevalence of each fee practice. All
proceedings taxed some state-court litigants. Plaintiffs’ leadership in
88.8 percent of the proceedings with publicly available settlements
negotiated some aspect of their common-benefit fee with the
defendant. While 36.6 percent of the proceedings included at least one
objection, that number is somewhat misleading for the most objectors
were either lead lawyers complaining about their cut of the commonbenefit fund allocations or attorneys concerned about taxing state
cases.
184. Not all proceedings are profitable and leaders’ out-of-pocket costs may exceed their
return. E.g., Consent Order Authorizing Final Disbursement from Common Benefit Fund
Account, In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 15, 2014) (noting that the executive committee expended far more in out-of-pocket costs
than was deposited into the common-benefit fund).
185. Information from the Asbestos litigation was not included since the early docket entries
are not electronically available.

2017]

MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

109

This convergence of fee-pricing practices is significant in
thinking through potential implications of cartel-like collusion across
multidistrict proceedings.186 Although the law punishes only explicit
collusion, game theory recognizes that when cartel members have
shared beliefs of how others will react to their behavior, it can have
real-world social and financial costs.187 When used alongside credible
punishment mechanisms, members’ shared understanding can sustain
a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium.188 Put simply, this
understanding becomes the new profit-maximizing norm, despite its
self-dealing nature. Accordingly, the following sections explain how
certain practices deviate from a well-accepted restitutionary theory of
fees, and how leaders’ self-interest in maximizing common-benefit fees
can breach their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs and endanger
adequate representation.

Escalating
Percentages Based on
Timing of Consent

Fee Aspects
Negotiated with
Defendant

1355

Propulsid

No

No

Yes, directly

1431

Baycol

No

No

1507

Prempro

No

No

1657

Vioxx

Yes

Yes

Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
Yes

1742

Ortho Evra

Yes

Yes

Confidential
settlement

Plaintiff Objections
to fees on MDL
Docket

MDL
Name

State-Court
Attorneys Taxed for
Common Benefit

MDL
No.

Common-Fund
Holdback Increased
Mid-stream

TABLE 2: COMMON-BENEFIT FEE PRACTICES OCCURRING IN
PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDING WITH NON-CLASS AGGREGATE
SETTLEMENTS IN THE DATASET

Yes, if state-court
judge orders or
counsel agrees, and
via settlement
agmt
Yes, via court order

No

Yes, via
participation agmt
Yes, via
participation agmt
and settlement
agmt
Yes, via
participation agmt

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

186. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 33–36 (1984) (observing that
in repeated games, the players are more likely to reach the cooperative, joint-maximizing
solution).
187. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.3, 4.4 (noting that adhering to “a common law concept
of ‘agreement’ . . . makes little sense in the context of strategic behavior among competing
firms”); Ayres, supra note 168, at 296–97.
188. Ayres, supra note 168, at 296–97.

Human Tissue

No

No

Confidential
settlement

2243

Fosamax

No

Yes

Yes

1836

Mirapex

1842

Kugel Mesh Hernia
Patch

Unknown
No

Unknown
No

Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement

1845

ConAgra Peanut
Butter

No

No

Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement
No

1871

Avandia

No

No

1909

Gadolinium Contrast
Dyes
Trasylol

No

Yes*

No

No

1928
1943

Levaquin

Yes

No

1953

Heparin

No

Yes

1964

NuvaRing

Yes

No

2004

Mentor Corp
ObTape
Chantix
(Varenicline)

No

No

Yes

Yes

2100

Yasmin & Yaz
(Drospirenone)

Yes

Yes

Yes

2158

Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup

No

No

Yes

2187

C R Bard, Inc Pelvic
Repair Sys

No

Yes*

Confidential
settlements

DePuy ASR Hip
Implant

Yes

2092

2197

Yes

Confidential
settlement
Confidential
settlement

Yes

Plaintiff Objections
to fees on MDL
Docket
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MDL
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MDL
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Yes, via participation
agmt (could exclude
state cases with a
promise not to use
common-work
product in them)
Yes, via participation
agmt and settlement
agmt
No order available

No

Yes, via participation
agmt and
jurisdiction over
defendant
Yes, if counsel
consents or if
plaintiff received a
tangible benefit
Yes, via participation
agmt
Yes, via participation
agmt
Yes, via participation
agmt
Yes, via court order

Yes

Yes, via participation
agmt
Yes, via order
claiming jurisdiction
over attorneys
Yes, via participation
agmt
Yes, via participation
agmt , or by
benefitting from
MDL work product
Yes, via participation
agmt and settlement
agmt
Yes, via settlement
agmt and court order
requiring all
plaintiffs to
participate in
settlement
Yes, via participation
agmt , by seeking
compensation, or
benefiting from
PSC’s work
Yes, via settlement
agmt subjecting
them to the court’s
fee order

No

No
No

Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes, one
No
No

No
Yes

Unknown
189

Yes, one
initially

189 Judge Goodwin presides over five technically separate pelvic-mesh proceedings; some
objections are filed in one proceeding, but pertain to all. None appear on this proceeding’s docket.

Fee Aspects
Negotiated with
Defendant

2299

Actos (Pioglitazone)

No

No

Yes

2325

American Medical
Systems

No

Yes*

Partially
confidential
settlements

2326

Boston Scientific
Corp Pelvic Repair
Sys

No

Yes*

Confidential
settlements

2327

Ethicon, Inc Pelvic
Repair

No

Yes*

Confidential
settlements

2373

Watson Fentanyl
Patch

No
order

No
order

Confidential
settlement

2391

Biomet Magnum Hip
Implant

No

No

Yes, directly

2385

Pradaxa

No

Yes

Kept confidential

No

Yes*

Kept confidential

23%
Yes

46 6%
Yes

Of the proceedings
with publicly
available
settlements, 88 8%
negotiated fees
with defendant (8
of 9)

2387

Coloplast Corp
Pelvic Support Sys
Total: 30 MDLs

Plaintiff Objections
to fees on MDL
Docket

MDL
Name
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Yes, court order
covered payments
made by defendants
to any plaintiff
participating in
settlement
Yes, via participation
agmt , by seeking
compensation, or
benefiting from
PSC’s work
Yes, via participation
agmt , by seeking
compensation, or
benefiting from
PSC’s work
Yes, via participation
agmt , by seeking
compensation, or
benefiting from
PSC’s work
No common benefit
order–cases brought
by one law firm
Yes, by signing
motion or seeking
compensation, and
by settlement agmt
Yes, by seeking
compensation
Yes, via participation
agmt
100% taxed statecourt attorneys in
some form;
88 8% of proceedings
with publicly
available settlements
(8 of 9) did so by
negotiating with
defendants

No

Unknown190

Unknown191

Unknown192

No
No

Yes
Unknown193
36 6% had
known
objections

*Escalating percentages were not specified in the order, but the judge noted that
attorneys who did not sign participation agreements may be subject to increased
assessments.

190
191
192
193

Supra note 189.
Supra note 189.
Supra note 189.
Supra note 189.
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1. Using Early Bird Discounts and Summary Fee Increases
When lead lawyers ask the judge to create a common-benefit
fund, the percentages are often modest. As Table 2 shows, however, at
least twenty-three percent of lead attorneys have found ways—
through court orders or settlement—to increase that assessment and
maximize profits as the litigation progresses. In Chantix,194
Yasmin/Yaz,195 DePuy ASR,196 and Levaquin,197 leadership requested
and received court-ordered fee increases without opposition.198 When
leaders made the same request in NuvaRing, one attorney did object,
but only as to his allocation as a steering committee member.199
Lead lawyers in Vioxx went one step further: they used
settlement to contract around the court’s three-percent commonbenefit fund and raise it to eight percent.200 Yet, unlike most examined

194. In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-02039-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Dec.
18, 2012) (order).
195. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., June 23, 2014) (case management order 63 supplement to
case management order no. 14,); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2014) (order granting 3315
Motion for Relief); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-02039-IPJ (N.D.
Ala. Dec. 18, 2012) (order).
196. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014) (amending Case Management Order No. 13); In re DePuy
Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov.
28, 2011) (case management order no. 1 at 5).
197. In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2013)
(second amended pretrial order no. 3) (setting fees at 9.5 percent); In re Levaquin Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2009) (pretrial order no. 3) (declining to set a
fee percentage).
198. In Baycol, the last available order on fees indicated a six percent holdback. In re Baycol
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:01-md-01431-MJD-SER (D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2011) (pretrial order 166,
closure of MDL 1431 Fee and Cost Account (Common Benefit Fund)). One attorney has, however,
indicated that “Baycol began at 4%, and was recently increased to 8%–12%.” Motion of Plaintiffs’
Executive Committee for Third Amendment to Case Management Order No. 9 at 4, In re Ortho
Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2008).
199. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough’s Objections to Special Master’s Recommendation for
Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2014); In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-MD-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9,
2011) (amended case management order no. 3). In Pradaxa, the judge addressed the entry and
subsequent withdrawal of objections by four firms on December 11, 2014 to distribution of
common-benefit funds. These objections are no longer available on the docket. However, in Judge
Herndon’s order, he states that all of the plaintiffs’ firms are currently in agreement over the
distribution of funds as of January 20, 2015. In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products
Liability Litigation, No. 3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2015) (order concerning
distribution of common-benefit fees and expenses).
200. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 9.2.1; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (pretrial order no. 19).
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cases, the carte blanche revision incited numerous objections.201
Accordingly, the judge appointed a Liaison Counsel, which eventually
persuaded leaders to decrease their request to 7.5 percent.202
Nevertheless, the judge reduced the award to 6.5 percent—still a
notable raise from the initial three percent.203
Finally, 46.6 percent of the proceedings in the data escalated
common-benefit fees based on how quickly individual counsel agreed
to them.204 For example, Ortho Evra initially levied fees and costs at
three percent and raised them to five for those who waited, but the
court later eliminated the discount.205 The court increased the tax
from three to six percent, applied it to all pending cases (early birds
too), and ruled that if newly filed or transferred cases failed to sign up
on time, then the fee would jump to eight percent.206 Plainly, the point
was to incentivize prompt buy-in.
The practice of escalating common-benefit fees is troubling in
two respects. First, judges typically issue these orders early in the

201. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47 (E.D. La. 2010); Silver,
supra note 170, at 2001–02 .
202. Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 646–47.
203. Id. at 655. On total fees and costs, see In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:05md-01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013) (pretrial order no. 51(A)) (awarding $40,000 in
costs plus $214,944.60 to liaison counsel); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2:05-md-01657-EFFDEK (E.D. La. Aug. 9, 2011) (order and reasons) (awarding $315,250,000.00 in attorneys’ fees);
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2:05-md-01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2009) (pretrial order
no. 51 on disbursement of costs) (awarding $40,049,748.16 in costs plus $500,000 to liaison
counsel).
204. In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products Liability Litigation, No. 3:12-md-02385DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012) (case management order no. 16 (establishing common-benefit
fee and expense fund)); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2010) (case management order no. 14
(establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund) at 3–4); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (case management order no. 17 at 3–4);
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Creation
of a Common Benefit Fund at 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (requesting a ten percent total assessment for those who waited until
settlement); In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-hc-60000-JGC (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2008)
(pretrial order no. 6 common benefit order); Participation Agreement, In re Gadolinium-Based
Contrast Agents Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-gd-50000-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2009) (noting
that those who do not sign the participation agreement “may be subject to an increased
assessment on all GBCA cases in which they have a fee interest”). Later amendments to the
pretrial order removed the escalating fees based on the timing of consent. See In re Heparin
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-hc-60000 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2008) (first amended pretrial order no. 6
common benefit order).
205. In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2009)
(third amended case management order no. 9).
206. Id.
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litigation.207 This may induce quick consent by participating attorneys,
but it does nothing to incentivize faithful agency by the steering
committee. In fact, it does precisely the opposite, particularly when
the order is designed to enlist competing state-court lawyers.
Professor Richard Nagareda’s observation on this point in the class
context holds true here as well: “What high-value damage claimants
need is not so much a ‘day in court’ as the prospect of a different
bargaining agent whose self-interest is not tied up with the sale of
[plaintiffs’] rights en masse so as to achieve maximum [closure].”208
Demanding early assent to the monopoly power by escalating fees or
summarily increasing fees during the litigation does no such thing.
Rather, it reduces the number of bargaining agents who might push
their clients’ cases toward trial in state court or postpone their consent
until they can decide whether the negotiated settlement benefits their
clients. Put simply, this practice reduces the prospect of a marketbased check on lead lawyers’ fees and results.
Second, increasing common-benefit fees for latecomers is at
odds with the purpose of a common-benefit fund, which is predicated
on unjust enrichment. Without a fund, non-lead attorneys might
prefer to free ride on leaders’ efforts, cash in on any resulting
settlement, and pocket the windfall. Unjust enrichment thwarts this
scenario when leaders confer a benefit, meaning that judges should
tailor fees to the benefit conferred.209 An escalating rate based on the
timing of the attorney’s consent may in no way approximate that
benefit; those who sign-up early may actually benefit more from
leaders’ efforts since they can access discovery materials and
independently assess acceptable settlement terms.
2. Expanding Fees to State-Court Litigants
Lead lawyers have not limited their fees to the confines of
federal jurisdiction. They have uniformly expanded their tax base and
raised the costs of competing by enveloping state-court claimants
through either “voluntary” participation agreements like those in fiftythree percent of the cases (e.g., Prempro,210 Human Tissue,211

207. For example, the Panel consolidated Fosamax on August 18, 2006. In re Fosamax
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006) (MDL transfer order).
Judge Keenan granted lead lawyers’ common-benefit fund request on January 5, 2010, and the
master settlement agreement is dated March 24, 2014.
208. Nagareda, supra note 1, at 168.
209. Burch, supra note 41, at 102–09.
210. Including state court litigants led to the following tally of fees and costs. In re Prempro
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. Sept. 28, 2015) (order) (awarding
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Ethicon,212 and American Medical Systems213) or settlement
provisions.214 Some judges, like the one in ConAgra Peanut Butter,
have been more cautious and assessed (without a participation
agreement) only those state litigators who consent or plaintiffs who
“received a tangible benefit” from leaders efforts,215 while others (as in
Kugel Mesh) have worried that using substantial benefit as a metric
may over-extend their jurisdiction to include unfiled claims.216 Still
others, like the judge in Levaquin, have changed their orders over the
course of litigation—moving from expressly taxing state plaintiffs
whose lawyer also has pending cases in the multidistrict proceeding,
to stating generally that the assessment obligation “attaches to cases,
claims, or attorneys within the full scope and extent” of the court’s
jurisdiction.217
$852,746.63); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. Sept. 9, 2015)
(order) (awarding $1,035,000); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-CRW (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 1, 2014) (order) (awarding $64,581,093); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2014) (order) (granting a total of $9,693,687.06 in costs and
fees).
211. In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:06-cv-00135-WJM-MF (D.N.J. Nov. 15,
2006) (pretrial order no. 4) (providing a “limited waiver option” that allowed litigants to pay six
percent, but promise not to use the work product in related state-court cases).
212. In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-02327 (S.D. W.
Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (pretrial order # 211 (order establishing criteria for applications to MDL 2327
fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and expenses incurred for
MDL administration and common benefit and appointment of common benefit fee and cost
committee)).
213. E.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic Repair Systems Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md02325 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (pretrial order no. 204 (order establishing criteria for
applications to MDL 2325 fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed
and expenses incurred for MDL administration and common benefit and appointment of common
benefit fee and cost committee) at 6–7); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:12-md-02325 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 26, 2013) (pretrial order. no. 77 (agreed order
establishing MDL 2325 fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and
expenses incurred for MDL administration and common benefit)).
214. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 231 (“[V]irtually all antitrust issues not
involving collaboration (or merger) among competitors are best analyzed by asking whether they
unjustifiably confer on one party the power to raise price by raising its rivals’ costs.”).
215. In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 7, 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion for the establishment
of a common-benefit fund).
216. In re Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01842-ML-LDA (D.R.I.
Nov. 19, 2009) (memorandum and order).
217. Compare In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Jan. 22,
2009) (pretrial order #3 on plaintiffs’ common-benefit fund, common cost fund, contingent fee
appointments, fee and cost sharing, time and expense reporting) (expressly taxing state plaintiffs
whose lawyers also have pending MDL cases), with In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2013) (second amended pretrial order #3 on plaintiffs’ common
expense fund for reimbursement of common-benefit costs only) (stating that the assessment
obligation attaches to cases, claims, and attorneys).
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Although taxing state litigants has proven thorny for judges
and far more objectionable to the litigating lawyers,218 the practice has
not waned. It continues to curb state courts’ potential use as a
competitive check on the federal proceeding, for rational attorneys are
unlikely to heavily invest in developing state cases or in novel theories
of liability only to have their recoveries taxed by federal leaders.
In 2011, the court in NuvaRing cited its jurisdiction over the
attorneys practicing before it as a means to levy the common-benefit
tax on settling state-court plaintiffs who used the same lawyers.219
The order explicitly included attorneys practicing in “New Jersey
State Court or any other state” with at least one case in the transferee
court.220 That hook then ensnared “all cases, including un-filed
cases.”221 The order also extended to attorneys who received any of the
steering committee’s work product.222 Consequently, when lead
lawyers negotiated the master settlement, there was no need to use it
to bait state-court plaintiffs into paying common-benefit fees—the
court’s order did it for them.
A similar proposed order in DePuy ASR aimed to “assess all
cases . . . regardless of whether any substantive benefit was conferred
by the PSC.”223 But some state lawyers balked: they had already
created a document repository with 12.5 million pages of discovery,
retained experts, and were prepared to litigate their clients’ claims
without any help from federal leaders.224 Citing precedent from the
Genetically Modified Rice litigation, where the judge declined to order
state-court litigants to contribute to a common-benefit fund, the
attorneys argued the transferee court lacked jurisdiction over them.225
Nevertheless, the court applied its order to all plaintiffs’ attorneys and
their law firms who represented a client in the multidistrict

218. E.g., In re Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01842-ML-LDA
(D.R.I. Sept. 2, 2009) (sur-reply memorandum of Johnson Law Firm plaintiffs in further support
of partial objection to motion for entry of an assessment order in MDL 1842) (objecting to the
assessment of state court plaintiffs).
219. In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011)
(amended case management order no. 3 at 2–3) (establishing Common Benefit Order).
220. Id. at 3–4.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id.
223. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Executive and Steering Committees’ Motion for
Entry of a Common Benefit Order at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2011).
224. Id.
225. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *9–
11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010) (memorandum and order) (creating a common-benefit fund).
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proceeding.226 When the leaders in DePuy ASR later requested
common-benefit fees, they did so under seal,227 presumably to avoid
further objections and public scrutiny.
Although the DePuy ASR court never received additional
objections, its implied rationale (and the explicit rationale given in
NuvaRing) has gradually eroded. Lead lawyers in the Genetically
Modified Rice litigation contracted around the judge’s decision not to
include state-court litigants through settlement. When challenged,
they argued the NuvaRing theory: that the federal court needed
jurisdiction over only the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendant—not
the plaintiffs themselves.228 But the Eighth Circuit disagreed: “Even if
the same plaintiffs’ attorneys participated in the MDL, the district
court overseeing the MDL does not have authority over separate
disputes between state-court plaintiffs and [the defendant].”229
More recently, in litigation over Avandia’s common-benefit
fees, the Third Circuit agreed with this core rationale—that district
courts cannot require attorneys who litigate solely in state court to
pay federal leadership fees.230 But courts can enforce participation
agreements that they require attorneys to sign if the attorney hopes to
access any of the federal work product.231 At best, this is jurisdictional
bootstrapping. The Avandia order assessed fees for all Avandia claims
in which an attorney who signed a participation agreement had a fee
interest, “regardless of whether those claims are subject to the
jurisdiction of MDL 1871.”232 So, a law firm that represented a few
clients in the multidistrict proceeding but filed most suits in state
courts (twenty-five and four thousand, respectively in the objector’s

226. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2011) (case management order no. 13).
227. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2015).
228. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig. Settlement, MDL No. 1811, §§ 8.1.1, 8.1.2 (MDL
settlement agreement).
229. Phipps Grp. v. Downing (In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig.), 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th
Cir. 2014). The judge has now certified a class composed of those lead lawyers, other law firms,
and clients who paid for common benefit services and expenses that is suing objectors for unjust
enrichment. See Downing v. Goldman Phipps PLLC, No. 4:13CV206 CDP, 2015 WL 4255342, at
*7–8 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015).
230. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 617 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d
Cir. 2015). For the total fees and costs awarded, see In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-md-01871, 2012 WL 6923367, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2002) (awarding
$143,750,000 as 6.25 percent of the estimated value of the settlements and $10,050,000 for
future administrative fees and expenses).
231. In re Avandia, 617 F. App’x at 141; see also In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-2990, 2016 WL 4010439, *2–5 (3d Cir. July 27, 2016).
232. In re Avandia, 617 F. App’x at 139.
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case) had to pay common-benefit fees for all clients, which deters firms
from investing in and developing competing state-court suits.233
In Avandia, the defendant used an ad hoc settlement strategy
without a master settlement,234 but global deals allow lead lawyers to
circumvent these jurisdictional problems. By inserting fee provisions
into a master settlement, plaintiffs (and their counsel) who want to
settle must also “consent” to leadership’s common-benefit fee. This
allows lead attorneys—with the defendant’s blessing—to reach
settling state-court plaintiffs who would otherwise fall outside of the
federal court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, eighty percent of proceedings
(eight of ten—Propulsid I & II,235 Vioxx,236 Fosamax,237 Biomet,238
Yasmin/Yaz,239 Actos,240 DePuy ASR I & II,241 and Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup242) with publicly available non-class settlements used those
agreements to subject all settling plaintiffs to the transferee judge’s
fee assessment. The two that did not insert fees into settlements
included NuvaRing and American Medical Systems, both of which had
broad court orders that already covered state plaintiffs.243
Of those that used settlements to reach state-court plaintiffs,
two stand out. First, in Fosamax, if a lawyer waited until settlement
to agree to the common-benefit tax (as many state-court attorneys
would), then the court’s order increased the tax from six to nine
percent.244 Second, in Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, the judge expressly
233. Although the objecting firm, Girardi Keese, petitioned for Supreme Court review, the
request was denied. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Girardi Keese Law Firm v. Plaintiffs’
Advisory Comm., No. 15-704, 2015 WL 7713601 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2015); Amanda Bronstad, Girardi
Keese Loses SCOTUS Bid in Avandia Fee Fight, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202750967854/Girardi-Keese-Loses-SCOTUS-Bid-inAvandia-Fee-Fight?slreturn=20160913080025 [https://perma.cc/JLT3-UA2Q].
234. Avandia Lawsuit, DRUGWATCH (May 16, 2016), http://www.drugwatch.com/Avandia/
lawsuit.php [https://perma.cc/4N8P-PB67].
235. Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 9(A); Second MDL Program Term Sheet
§ 9(A), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005).
236. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 9.2.1.
237. Fosamax Settlement, supra note 129, ¶ 14.
238. Settlement Agreement § 10(b), In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Biomet Settlement].
239. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 4.01(B), (C); Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra
note 139, § 1.03 (subjecting accepting state-court participants to the MDL court’s jurisdiction and
presumably its fee awards).
240. Actos Settlement, supra note 148, § 10.04.
241. 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.1.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement,
supra note 146, § 4.1.8.
242. Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § V.C.
243. Supra notes 213, 219–223.
244. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010)
(case management order no. 17 establishing plaintiffs’ common defense fund at 3–4). For the
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struck proposed language in the common-benefit order that taxed
state-court litigants.245 But leaders then contracted around this
restriction via settlement and included a provision that unilaterally
taxed all settling plaintiffs four percent.246 The court then ratified the
workaround in two ways: (1) by ordering all multidistrict plaintiffs to
participate in the settlement’s mediation process, comply with its
deadlines, or face dismissal;247 and (2) by requiring all participating
lawyers to register all their cases (filed or unfiled, in state or federal
court).248 The result was that lead lawyers effectively used their
bargaining authority with the defendant to expand both the federal
court’s jurisdiction and leaders’ fee base to include settling state-court
cases and unfiled claims.
3. Negotiating Common-Benefit Fees with the Defendant
Anytime lead lawyers negotiate aspects of their fees with the
defendant, they raise concerns about self-dealing.249 Contingent fees
are designed to increase proportionally alongside a plaintiff’s
recovery—to tie the fates of lawyer and client. When leaders take
things one step further and bargain for the defendant to pay their
common-benefit fees directly, they sever that tie. As a result, the
attorneys’ financial self-interest may no longer be linked to their
clients’ outcome, but to the defendant’s wishes.250
Despite these self-dealing concerns, this is precisely what lead
lawyers did in both Biomet and Propulsid. In Propulsid, lead lawyers
asked the court to ratify the fees they negotiated directly with the
total calculation of fees and costs, see In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFKJCF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2015) (case management order no. 21 concerning release of commonbenefit funds); Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum in Support of its Consent Motion
for Distribution of Common Benefit Funds, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015) (noting that contributions, costs, and held costs would
constitute most of the fund, $2,426,126 of $2,459,475). For awards to plaintiffs see Declaration of
Timothy M. O’Brien ¶ 6, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015).
245. In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-MCA (D.N.J.
Jan. 21, 2011) (case management order 3: order establishing common-benefit fund).
246. Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § V.C.
247. In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J.
May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
248. Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § I.B.
249. Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 134.
250. This concern has long been recognized as one of structural collusion in the class
context. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J.
625, 647–48 (1987). Courts have agreed. E.g., Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d
1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1999). For an excellent analysis of the problem in multidistrict litigation, see
Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 133–34.
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defendant by citing common benefit as a supporting rationale.251
Unjust enrichment lies at the heart of common-benefit awards.252 As
such, fees must come out of that benefit (the fund), not directly from
the defendant. And the work must benefit the claimants. In Propulsid,
only thirty-seven of 6,012 (0.6 percent) claimants received no more
than $6.5 million collectively; the strict claims process extinguished
the rest.253 Yet, lead lawyers collected over $27 million in “commonbenefit” fees,254 vividly illustrating the worry that a defendant might
negotiate higher fees in exchange for less relief to claimants.255
By contrast, the Biomet outcome initially appears less
troubling. Lead lawyers negotiated a $6 million fee directly with the
defendant via a separate agreement contingent on fulfilling the
plaintiff-participation percentages, as well as a five-percent fee
assessment (plus one percent for costs).256 But the court’s order
required them to accept the lesser of the two—not both.257 In their fee
request, lead lawyers noted that $6 million was the lesser award given
that the gross settlement award was $144.3 million, five percent of
251. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 12, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).
252. Burch, supra note 41, at 102–04; Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’
Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663–66 (1991).
253. This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program and had
their claims extinguished but did not submit claim forms. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Distribution of Attorney’s Fees at 5 and Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’
Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. July
31, 2012). The totals added in the text are not, of course, in the Joint Report, but derived from
numbers provided in that and previous reports.
254. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3,
2014) (order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2,
2005) (order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds (MDL Settlement Program), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Distribution of Attorney’s Fees at 5, Ex. B (Re: MDL Settlement Program II), In re Propulsid
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); Propulsid I
Settlement, supra note 104, § 19.
255. Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 133.
256. Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet
Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund ¶ 7, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015) (“Pursuant to a separately
negotiated settlement agreement dated January 31, 2014, the Biomet Common Benefit
Settlement Agreement (CBSA), Biomet will deposit an additional $6 million into the Biomet
Common Benefit Attorney’s Fee Fund for the sole purpose of resolving the Common Benefit
Attorney Fees associated with this litigation.”).
257. In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLMCAN (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2014) (case management order establishing common-benefit fee and
expense funds § 2(c)).
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which made the common-benefit set aside $7.2 million.258 Moreover,
they argued that $6 million was but 3.99 percent of the total
settlement value—a figure “many objective parties” would cite as
“being underpaid.”259 Leadership, however, “agree[d] that this amount
is reasonable” because negotiating their fee with Biomet allowed “for
100% return of the provisional 5% assessment to counsel and
claimants alike.”260
Biomet leaders appear generous. But lead lawyers apparently
represented most settling claimants, for they had no cases left after
the settlement, and the judge had to appoint a new steering
committee.261 As such, the $6 million fee seems like a bonus at best
(paid by the defendant presumably in exchange for something), or
double dipping at worst. If leaders represented most claimants, a
traditional set aside would simply take money from their contingent
fee and pay it back to them in common-benefit fees. But accepting $6
million directly from the defendant avoided that pocket-shifting
charade and may have compensated lead lawyers again for work they
had already agreed to perform under their clients’ initial retainer.262
Common-benefit fees are supposed to compensate attorneys for the
benefit they confer on others—not for work on their own cases.263
Moreover, accepting payment from the defendant violates basic agency
law, for side payments negotiated without client consent should be
given directly to clients.264

258. Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet
Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund ¶ 10, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015).
259. Id. ¶ 18.
260. Id.
261. In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLMCAN (N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2015) (order).
262. Burch, supra note 41, at 132–33.
263. Id.
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02, 8.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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C. Cartel-like Sanctions Suppress Dissent and Competition
If lead lawyers are overreaching in settlement design, flouting
ethical obligations, reducing non-leaders’ fees, and failing to consider
conflicts, then why do non-lead attorneys rarely object?265 Most
plaintiffs’ attorneys play the long game. Objecting in the face of
judicially sanctioned cooperative norms and powerful repeat players
can render them ineligible for future leadership roles and diminish
their chances of receiving common-benefit work.
In this way, plaintiffs’ leadership across multidistrict
proceedings can act like oligopolies and cartels.266 Cartels punish
defectors by imposing costs on them and denying them access.267 When
attorneys become lead lawyers, they have the power to control access
and inflict costs, too: they distribute common-benefit work to allies,
use settlements to restrict attorney advertising and reduce attorney
demand, suggest common-benefit fee allocations, and report
uncooperative behavior to the judge—carrots and sticks, in other
words, that impair rivals’ financial and leadership opportunities.268
For example, when the judge in the DePuy ASR Hip Implant litigation
appointed a fee committee comprised in part of several high-level
repeat players—Chris Seeger, Pete Flowers, and Steve Skikos—they
had the power and means to sanction, reward, and incentivize others,
particularly those in the five other pending hip-implant
proceedings.269
Given the degree of specialization and capital contributions
required to litigate multidistrict proceedings, the plaintiffs’ bar is
relatively small. Attorneys work together frequently. As such, they

265. Supra tbl.2.
266. Leslie, supra note 15, at 587–90.
267. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.1, 4.1a3 (noting some similarities between cartels and
oligopolies); Ayres, supra note 168, at 306–10.
268. See Ayres, supra note 168, at 306–08 (discussing how cartels can punish through
advertising); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 148
(2005) (defining anticompetitive exclusionary conduct). Judges often appoint lead lawyers to fee
allocation committees and solicit input on how to distribute attorneys’ fees. E.g., In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. June 13, 2012) (order)
(appointing lead lawyers to fee allocation committee). Power needn’t be equal among members;
they must simply have enough authority to credibly threaten to punish defectors. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 179 n.42 (1991).
269. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 10-MD2197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (case management order no. 25). Contemporaneously
pending hip implant cases included Biomet (MDL No. 2391), DePuy ASR (MDL No. 2197),
Zimmer Durom (MDL No. 2158), Wright Medical Technology (MDL No. 2329), DePuy Pinnacle
(MDL. No. 2391), and Stryker Rejuvenate and ABG II Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation
(MDL No. 13-2441) (consolidated on June 12, 2013).
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form a close-knit group (though not necessarily one predicated on
friendship)270 that may develop and enforce norms to maximize
members’ collective welfare in current, concurrent, and future
litigation.271 As repeat actors interact with one another regularly, they
form dyadic relationships to others in the social network,272 which
allows gossip and information about attorneys’ reputations and
common practices to flow freely among them. This may give lawyers
inside information about past payoffs and sanctions. Because
information flows easily through the network, it increases the
opportunities for both tacit and explicit collusion and enables leaders
to credibly punish and reward others for following or disregarding
norms.273
Although off-the-record conversations with involved attorneys
suggest social and financial sanctions are prevalent, they are
nevertheless difficult to assess quantitatively. The best evidence is
silence. These are, after all, the same attorneys who generate the
robust literature on collateral attacks in class actions and partake in
reverse auctions where defendants play them off of one another to
achieve the lowest settlement price. News reports of infighting among
plaintiffs’ lawyers, secret financial deals, payoffs, as well as occasional
judicial opinions about fee disputes, just scratch the surface of their
complex and often acrimonious relationships.274 Despite ample
anecdotal conversations off-the-record, objectors rarely speak up

270. “A group is close-knit when informal power is broadly distributed among group
members and the information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.”
ELLICKSON, supra note 268, at 177–78. Moreover, these close-knit groups have social networks
that allow for credible and reciprocal applications of power. Id. at 181.
271. E.g., id. at 167–78.
272. Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 16–23).
273. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED 160–61 (2009) (noting
how networks among boards of directors allow for collusion and market manipulation);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.4a (distinguishing between tacit and express collusion with
regard to oligopolies); Leslie, supra note 15, at 589–91, 598–99 (explaining trust-based networks
and sanctions in cartels).
274. E.g., Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman &
Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995–96 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (describing lawsuit between two
plaintiffs’ firms over the alleged breach of a joint venture agreement in antitrust lawsuits);
Emily Field, Atty Who Exposed GM Switch Defect Blasts Drivers’ Attys, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/750639/atty-who-exposed-gm-switch-defect-blasts-drivers-attys
[https://perma.cc/KE66-ZRUJ] (chronicling allegations by one lead lawyer against co-lead counsel
that they had made decisions based on their own financial interests and froze out other executive
committee members in decisionmaking); Alison Frankel, Exposing Class Action Objectors: Lieff
Cabraser, Ted Frank in ‘Lurid’ Dispute, REUTERS (June 22, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2015/06/22/exposing-class-action-objectors-lieff-cabraser-ted-frank-in-lurid-dispute/
[https://perma.cc/A9LM-FNAX] (chronicling the business relationship between nonprofit objector
Ted Frank and for-profit plaintiffs’ lawyer, Christopher Bandas).
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during leadership selection, even though being chosen generates
significant fees. Nor do most attorneys object when lead lawyers ask
the judge to increase their common-benefit fees midway through the
litigation, even though it reduces individual attorneys’ profits.275 This
silence speaks volumes.
Policing group norms doesn’t just affect leadership
appointments and compensation. Evidence from social science
suggests that the conditions likely present in these leadership groups
may infect substantive decisions, too. When reputation is important,
group members tend to adjust their positions to tilt toward whatever
the dominant member believes and are more likely to withhold
opposition.276 Moreover, even when privy to unique information that
others lack, lower-status members tend not to voice that information
for fear of disapproval.277 Discussing shared information is safer; it
leads others to view the member as more competent, credible, and
knowledgeable.278 But attorneys have different expertise and diverse
clients. When that information is not shared, representation is poorer
because of its absence.
D. What Then Do Plaintiffs Receive?
Based on the limited non-class settlements available, there is
reason to be concerned that when repeat players influence the
practices and norms that govern multidistrict proceedings the results
they obtain may principally benefit them at the plaintiffs’ expense,

275. Several attorneys objected to the court creating a common-benefit fund in the ConAgra
Peanut Butter litigation. The lead lawyers then mooted those objections by exempting the
objectors from the assessment. In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion
for the establishment of a common-benefit fund); Transcript of Proceedings at 26, In re ConAgra
Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2009).
276. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 26–27
(2009).
277. Id. at 28–29; see also Armin Faulk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces
Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017 (2005) (finding that cooperating group
members impose the most severe sanctions on defectors and that retaliation is a driving factor
behind fairness-driven informal sanctions); Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social
Preferences Matter—the Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and
Incentives, 112 ECON. J. C1, C2–C3 (2002); Michael Schrage, Daniel Kahneman: The Thought
Leader Interview, 33 STRATEGY+BUSINESS 121, 124 (Winter 2003). Reciprocity and reputational
concerns, along with trustworthiness, are most robust when people cooperate with one another
over time in repeated interactions. Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good
Experiment, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 275, 291–92 (2002).
278. SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 29.

2017]

MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

125

particularly those plaintiffs with idiosyncratic claims.279 Leaders face
systematic temptations at multiple points to serve themselves and act
disloyally toward plaintiffs. As such, when repeat players collaborate,
collectively maintain market power, and appear not to improve
plaintiffs’ results, there is cause for concern.280
Neither clients nor their attorneys freely consent to
multidistrict litigation or the subsequent selection of lead counsel. In
fact, many actively resist transfer; lawyers often push for the
transferee court to remand their cases to their original court.281 This
non-voluntary aspect makes selecting lead lawyers akin to appointing
class counsel.282 But judges pay little attention to adequate
representation on the front end—often appointing leaders before
conflicts are known. And though plaintiffs have individually retained
counsel (unlike all but the named plaintiff in class actions), that
attorney has little to no control once the judge empowers the leaders.
She cannot fire lead attorneys even when she feels they are not acting
in her clients’ best interest, and she regains control of her clients’ suits
only in the unlikely event of remand. Often, the most she can do is
complain that the leaders have violated their fiduciary obligations to
the whole group—a move that risks alienating her from receiving
common-benefit work and future lead roles.283
The checks and balances for ensuring adequate representation
are likewise absent on the back end. Even though class settlements
included coercive provisions as well,284 without a class, judges lack the
explicit authority to ensure private non-class settlements are “fair,
279. The practices I have described likewise have a significant impact on autonomy
considerations that rest on an assumed right to decline a settlement. See Martin H. Redish &
Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers
of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 114 (2015) (raising due process concerns with
multidistrict litigation even when individual litigants can “opt out” of a settlement).
280. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 163–
64 (2005) (“[A]ntitrust policy tolerates collaboration among competitors who collectively have
market power only to the extent that it tends to reduce costs or improve products, and the firms
pass at least some of these economic improvements on to consumers.”).
281. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer, In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:12-md-02326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 2016).
282. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 279, at 110–11 (unfavorably contrasting due process
protections under Rule 23 with those in multidistrict litigation).
283. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 234 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Whether or not there is a direct or formal attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs and
the PSC, the PSC and its IRPA members necessarily owed a fiduciary obligation to the
plaintiffs.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22 (2004) (discussing the selection
of lead counsel and fiduciary duties); Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 119–20 (noting the
difficulties in challenging the selection of lead counsel).
284. E.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
For an in-depth overview of such provisions, see Nagareda, supra note 1, at 204–16.
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reasonable, and adequate.”285 And lead lawyers have no incentive to
raise conflicts. They profit from their own clients’ contingent fees and
common-benefit fees—from representing as many people as possible—
not from recognizing divergent interests. Their common-benefit fees
are typically measured by the time they spend litigating, not by
plaintiffs’ recoveries or the benefits obtained. Put simply, leaders’
compensation destroys the contingent fee’s simple beauty: when
functioning properly, contingent fees align the financial interests of
attorneys and clients, preventing the need for expensive monitoring.
But multidistrict litigation instills monopolistic control in leaders’
hands, severs the contingent-fee link for their common-fund
compensation, and then inhibits monitoring by allowing lead
attorneys to operate in secret away from the watchful eye of non-lead
lawyers.286
Collateral attacks, attorney malpractice actions, and appeals
are not much help either. Even though class actions can be
problematic too, at least non-class counsel stood to gain from soliciting
a sub-segment of a previously certified class, filing a new case, and
contending that preclusion didn’t apply because of inadequate
representation. But master settlements are predicated on client
consent, which can blanket the host of wrongs that preceded it: to
enroll in a settlement, both clients and their individual attorneys must
expressly waive all of their objections to both the settlement
documents and the release of their claims.287 Conversely, those who do
not settle have no standing to challenge the settlement’s terms and
have few options other than trying to convince enough plaintiffs to
hold out so as to trigger the walkaway clause. Even though attorney
malpractice suits are still possible, they are unlikely since courts and
commentators have interpreted the governing ethics rules
inconsistently.288 Finally, as private deals, settlements are not
appealable. And, on the off chance an appeal could occur, some judges
have gone so far as to expressly waive parties’ ability to appeal
through their common-benefit fund participation agreement.289

285. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
286. E.g., In re DePuy ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 2016) (sealed order no. 18) (granting sealed motion for common-benefit fees).
287. E.g., 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, at 22–23 (certification of counsel).
288. Compare Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune & Jones, L.L.C., 204 P.3d 617, 628–30 (Kan. 2009)
(finding evidence of an ethics violation in executing an aggregate settlement), with G.H. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 412 S.W.3d 326, 327–28, 327 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no violation under
similar circumstances).
289. E.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (pretrial order no. 54 at 5–6):
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Thus, few regulatory mechanisms exist to police the line
between acceptable settlements that rational claimants should accept
because the offer is simply too good to pass up, and those that they
can’t refuse in the non-consensual “Godfather sense,” as Professor
Richard Nagareda has described them.290 That is, some coercive
settlement terms can be akin to a metaphorical gun to the head.
Consequently, this Section considers the probable costs the absence of
monitoring creates.
1. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Receive the Peace Premium
Because defendants need to end lawsuits to ease shareholders’
minds about future business prospects, delivering finality can unlock a
“peace premium,” gains for plaintiffs that might not exist otherwise.291
But with no accountability, repeat players may be tempted to design
mutually beneficial deals that allow them to reap the peace
premium—not the plaintiffs.
Table 3 below gathers the available information about leaders’
common-benefit fees and costs and displays it alongside claimants’
recoveries for the non-class settlements occurring within the
dataset.292 Some claimants fare better than others, and there are
variables that are inherently unknown to outside researchers, such as
how many weak claims might have flooded the litigation. But points of
concern linger.293 Take Propulsid, for example: only 0.6 percent of

Participating Counsel have (or will have) agreed to and therefore will be bound by the
court’s determination on common benefit attorney fee awards, attorney fee
allocations, and expense awards, and the Participating Counsel knowingly and
expressly waive any right to appeal those decisions or the ability to assert the lack of
enforceability of this Agreed Order or to otherwise challenge its adequacy.
290. Richard Nagareda has written about class-action provisions extensively in these terms.
See Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out
Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 141.
291. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413–17 (2014); Nagareda, supra note 1, at 164; Rave,
supra note 92, at 1192–98.
292. Costs include reimbursement for money attorneys spent to litigate the suit. For
information on the dataset, see supra Part I.A.
293. Anecdotal evidence is rife with mistrust of the deals these lawyers create. See, e.g.,
Barry Meier, Frustration from a Deal on Flawed Hip Implants, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/business/frustration-from-a-deal-on-flawed-hip-implants
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TE8L-ZVYK]:
But some patients contend that the deal’s real winners are Johnson & Johnson and
the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Those lawyers are set to receive about one-third of the
settlement, or about $800 million. The single biggest chunk of those fees will go to the
firms most involved with developing cases against Johnson & Johnson and
negotiating the settlement; they will get a bonus of about $160 million.
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claimants recovered money, totaling little more than $6.5 million.294
Yet, leaders collected over $27 million in fees.295 If those claims lacked
merit, as some believe,296 then judicially dismissing them earlier
seems preferable to paying the leadership a premium to disserve their
clients. The latter undermines contingent-fee principles, perpetuates
public fears about attorneys getting rich while doing little for those
they represent, and diminishes litigants’ faith in the judicial system.
To be sure, Propulsid is an outlier in some respects, but its
steering committee’s statement that it would serve as a template for
future proceedings rang true. As Part II.A.1 illustrated, some aspect of
the three closure provisions Propulsid introduced—attorney
recommendation, attorney withdrawal, and walkaway clauses—were
later replicated, in whole or in part, in all future settlements in the
data.297 The full effects of that replication, however, are impossible to
trace for some aspect of twenty-seven of the twenty-nine deals that
followed it (ninety-three percent) remain confidential. From the data
that is available, the low payout rates in Ortho Evra298 and

294. This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program and had
their claims extinguished but did not submit claim forms. See Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-MD-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see also Joint Report No.
97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-MD1355 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012). The totals added in the text are not in the Joint Report but are
derived from numbers provided in that and previous reports.
295. In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3,
2014) (order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2,
2005) (order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEFKWR (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s
Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 19.
296. But see Melody Petersen, Jury Levies $100 Million Award Against Heartburn Drug
Maker, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/us/jury-levies-100million-award-against-heartburn-drug-maker.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/BY67-GZV2]
(“A
Mississippi jury awarded $100 million in damages late Friday night to 10 people who said they
had been injured by Propulsid, a heartburn drug that was taken from pharmacy shelves last
year after it was linked to dozens of deaths.”).
297. Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 42–43).
298. On fees and costs awarded, see In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2012) (order) (awarding $950,000 for post-label cases); In re Ortho
Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio July 20, 2010) (order) (awarding
$253,645.20 in expenses); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D.
Ohio May 22, 2009) (order) (awarding $2,338,280.10 in expenses); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2008) (order) (awarding $522,959.56 in
expenses); and Memorandum in Support of PSC’s Motion for Reimbursement of Common Benefit
Expenses at 2–3, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio June
28, 2010) (noting sealed amount awarded as $43,238.20 and requesting an additional
$253,645.20). For payouts, see Transcript of Status Conference, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab.
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NuvaRing299 are alarming when compared with common-benefit fees.
Recovery rates appear higher in Vioxx,300 Biomet,301 Pradaxa,302 and
perhaps Yaz/Yasmin,303 which is still pending, but it’s precisely the
dearth of information for the remaining ninety-three percent that
should trouble us most given how little regulation exists. Put simply,
if the information that lead lawyers are willing to make visible so
readily appears to enrich them and the defendants with whom they
broker the deal, one is left to wonder what the private aspects must
look like. Plainly, the concern is that the gains unlocked in exchange

Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2009). As of March 31, 2008, the court
assessed a three percent award of $2,061,535.29 based on settlements to date, which means
plaintiffs recovered $68,717,843.00. Memorandum in Support of PSC’s Motion for
Reimbursement of Certain Advanced Costs at 4, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2008). No updates are available after 2008.
299. For information on fees and costs, see In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., 4:08-md01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014) (order approving the special master’s report and
recommendation regarding the allocation and distribution of common-benefit fees and expenses);
Proposed Order Granting Special Master’s Supplemental Report and Recommendation, In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Sept. 15, 2015); Special
Master’s Supplemental Report and Recommendation at 7, Ex. A, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2015) (awarding $893,387.73 in commonbenefit fees); and Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 16, Ex. 1, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014) (recommending $10,123,395 in fees and
$2,923,034.88 in expenses). For claims rates, see Transcript of Status Hearing at 7, In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS, (E.D. Mo. Sept. 9, 2015) (noting that 424
out of 3,704 had been denied, and 473 (based on numbers given) were still in the claims review
process).
300. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2014)
(order and reasons at 8).
301. In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLMCAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2015) (order) (paying $6 million in common-benefit fees to the first
steering committee and $849,250.00 to the Garretson Resolution Group); Motion for Payment of
Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet Common Benefit MDL
Assessment Fund ¶¶ 10–12, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015).
302. For fees and costs, see Special Master’s Report and Recommendation on the
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2014). For claimant recovery, see
Case Management Order No. 88 at 7, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Eexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2014).
303. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2015) (minute order approving special master’s
report and recommendation) (awarding $77,644,000.00 in fees, and $5,803,010.77 in costs);
Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and Distribution of
Common Benefit Fees and Expenses, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices
& Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2015); Transcript of
Proceedings Status Conference at 2–3, 7, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (providing
information on claimants’ recovery rates).
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for delivering peace may be common-benefit fees—not enhancements
for claimants.
Indeed, one theme emerges from dissecting the settlements:
repeat players on both sides persistently benefit from the current
system. Defendants gain closure, and lead lawyers broker deals that
reward them handsomely and sometimes pay litigants very little.
These outcomes are tied to the settlements, which fuse individual
lawyers’ financial interests to the defendant’s closure goal. Without
tendering one’s entire client list over to the settlement, the
defendant’s required claimant-participation rate would fail, the deal
would collapse, and attorneys’ fees would disappear. Still, the point is
not that lead plaintiffs’ attorneys explicitly collude with the defendant
by trading closure for fees.304 Nor is there a viable means to
demonstrate that leaders’ monopolistic power leads to lower outputs,
for even if they exist, few alternative settlement values are publicly
available for comparison. Instead, the point is this: setting aside bad
faith and overt collusion still leaves one key fact—the same players
appear in the vast majority of these proceedings and design
remarkably similar settlements that benefit themselves. And that
suggests that oversight is warranted.

304. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.4b, 4.6a (explaining tacit collusion in oligopolies
and noting that “[f]actors such as high concentration on the seller’s side and diffusion on the
buyer’s side, significant economies of scale, a standardized product and publicly announced
prices and terms, suggest that a market is conductive to express or tacit collusion”); Howard M.
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 963 (2014)
(noting that defining collusion as a “secret agreement for a wrongful purpose” is a “red herring”).
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TABLE 3: COMMON-BENEFIT AWARDS AND NON-CLASS
CLAIMANT RECOVERY WITHIN THE DATA

6%
6% (4/2)

5% fed;
3% state
3% (2/1)

5% fed;
3% state
6 5%

Kept
confidential
$77,768,733

Baycol

1507

Prempro

No

1657

Vioxx

Yes

Aggregate Amount of
Recovery

6%
6%

Propulsid

1431

Percent of Claimants
Who Recovered

Final Percentages of
Fees and Costs

Yes, I
& II
No

1355

Recovery to Claimants

Common-Benefit Fee
and Cost Awards

Initial Percentage of
Fees and Costs

Common-Benefit Fees

Non-class Settlement
Publicly Available

MDL Name

MDL Number

MDL Information

$27,026,449

0 6% (37 of
6,012)
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
65 9% (32,886
of 49,893)
15% (state);
5% (federal)
Kept
confidential

$6,521,482 74

Kept
confidential

$356,054,692

Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
$4,353,152,064

1742

Ortho Evra

No

3%

6 to 8%

$41,081,123

1763

Human Tissue

No

6% fed;
4% state

6% fed;
4% state

1789

Fosamax

Yes

9%

9%

Only partial
information
available
$2,459,475

1836

Mirapex

No

Unknown

1842

Kugel Mesh
Hernia Patch
ConAgra
Peanut Butter
Avandia

No

12% (8/4)

Unknown
12% (8/4)

$11,004,673

No

4%

4%

$266,052 21

No

7%

7% (4/3)

$153,800,000

No

6% (5/1)

6% (5/1)

Sealed

1928

Gadolinium
Contrast Dyes
Trasylol

No

6%

6%

$1,323,202

1943

Levaquin

No

Unknown

9 5%

Sealed

1953

Heparin

No

6% (3/3)

6% (3/3)

Sealed

Yes

8% (5/3)

15 5%
(11/4 5)

$13,939,817

Mentor Corp
ObTape
Chantix
(Varenicline)
Yasmin & Yaz
(Drospirenone)

No

5%

5% (3/2)

No

6%

7% (4/3)

Not yet
awarded
Sealed

Yes, I
& II

6% (4/2)

11% (9/2)
for ATE;
6% (4/2)
for gall

$83,447,010
(partial
amount, will
increase as
VTE cases
settle)

2158

Zimmer
Durom Hip
Cup

Yes

Kept
confidential

C R Bard, Inc
Pelvic Repair
Sys

No

4% (2/2)
State and
federal
plaintiffs
5%

Not yet
awarded

2187

4% (2/2)
Federal
plaintiffs
only
5%

Kept
confidential
$27,327,500
1,100 “resolved”
No information
available
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Unknown
Fund amount:
$100,000,000
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Partial info:
VTE cases $1,800,000,000
for 9,185
claimants;
Gallbladder
cases–59% paid
as of 4/20/15
Kept
confidential

Not yet
awarded

Kept
confidential

Kept
confidential

1845
1871
1909

1964
2004
2092
2100

NuvaRing

Unknown

No information
available
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
42% (1,556 of
3,704 as of
Sept 9, 2015)
Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential
Partial info:
Gallbladder
1,386 approved
out of 1,410;
total pending 7,205 as of
9/29/14

$68,717,843
(partial)
Kept
confidential
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2391
2385

2387

Aggregate Amount of
Recovery

2373

Percent of Claimants
Who Recovered

2327

Common-Benefit Fee
and Cost Awards

2326

Final Percentages of
Fees and Costs

2325

Recovery to Claimants

Initial Percentage of
Fees and Costs

2299

Common-Benefit Fees

Non-class Settlement
Publicly Available

2197

DePuy ASR
Hip Implant
Actos
(Pioglitazone)
American
Medical
Systems
Boston
Scientific Cor
Pelvic Repair
Ethicon, Inc
Pelvic Repair
Watson
Fentanyl
Patch

Yes, I
& II
Yes

4% (3/1)

6% (5/1)

Sealed

Sealed

Sealed

None set

8 6%

Semi

5%

5%

$25,000,000
withheld305
Not yet
awarded

Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential

Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential

No

5%

5%

Not yet
awarded

Kept
confidential

Kept
confidential

No

5%

5%

No

No order

No order

Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential

Kept
confidential
Kept
confidential

Biomet
Magnum Hip
Implant
Pradaxa

Yes

6% (5/1)

3 99%

Not yet
awarded
No order
(most claims
brought by
one firm)
$6,849,250

Kept
confidential

6%

6% (4/2)

$26,000,000

$144,365,980
for 1,837
claimants
$650,000,000
for 4,444
claimants

Coloplast
Corp Pelvic
Support Sys

No

5%

5%

Not yet
awarded

Avg 5 65%
(for 26)

Avg
6 55 %
(for 28)

Avg (for 10
known)
$73,568,786
84

MDL Name

MDL Number

MDL Information
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No

30 total
10 of 17 proceedings with publicly
available settlements (3 with 2
each) for 13 total publicly available
settlements

96 8% (4,444 of
4,590; 9
categories of
payouts)
Kept
confidential
Avg 61%
recovered (for 5
proceedings)
(8,061 8
recovered;
13,121 8 did
not)

Kept
confidential
Unknown

2. Plaintiffs Appear to Be Inadequately Represented
The overarching danger for plaintiffs is inadequate
representation. Profiting at claimants’ expense can disserve all
settling plaintiffs equally, but since multidistrict proceedings require
only a common question of fact, litigants can also be uniquely
disadvantaged vis-à-vis one another. In class actions, due process
requires separate representation when structural conflicts of interest
exist.306 Structural conflicts “present a significant risk that the
lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the
litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside

305 In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La.
Sept. 1, 2015) (case management order: holdback order at 5).
306. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 625–26 (1997) (noting the class must share the same interest and injuries).
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from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor
claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”307 Multidistrict
litigation should demand no less.
Plainly, settlement provisions that chiefly benefit lead lawyers
risk violating this principle, but conflicts among claimants can prove
disabling, too. Differences may manifest while trying to establish
liability, such as variations among claims308 and injuries,309 state-ofthe-art issues,310 claims arising pre- and post-label changes, statutes
of limitation,311 state law discrepancies,312 or insurance-coverage
questions,313 while others may arise only when contemplating
remedies. In direct representation, informed consent can paper over
many conflicts, and only some will amount to structural conflicts.314
But most conflicts will not be apparent at the outset of the case when
leaders are appointed and clients do not freely consent to that
representation. Likewise, forcing their attorneys to sign commonbenefit participation agreements to gain access to leaders’ work
product in no way alleviates this concern.

307. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
308. See, e.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-md-01811-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr.
18, 2007) (order appointing leadership counsel) (appointing separate representatives for
Mississippi farmers and farmers who would prefer to litigate individually in state court).
309. For instance, hip-implant plaintiffs who had surgery revising the injury claimed will be
differently situated than those without, and some claimed cobalt and chromium poisoning as
well as device loosening. E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 27–29, In re Biomet M2a-Magnum
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2012)
(discussing differences between plaintiffs subject to revision surgery and those who have the
device still implanted).
310. For example, in the hip implant litigation cases differed over the information available
to surgeons in different years. Id. at 27 (discussing which cases to select for bellwether trials
because there are “some serious state-of-the-art issues which plague two sides as to whether an
orthopedic surgeon in 2011, who’s implanting a device after substantial information, is a totally
different case”).
311. E.g., id. at 30 (“There may be some rogue cases that are older that there’s some statute
of limitations.”).
312. When transferee courts do remand actions, they often cite case-specific differences in
state laws as a reason for remanding. E.g., In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1200 (D. Minn. 2012); In re Light
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me. 2011); In re NuvaRing
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS, 2009 WL 4825170, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2009).
313. E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 958–59
(W.D. Wis. 2008) (subclassing a class action because of different statutes of limitation); Maloney
v. Califano, 88 F.R.D. 293, 294–95 (D.N.M. 1980) (subclassing based on the time taken by the
government to make disability determinations).
314. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 282 (“[A]lthough concurrent client-client
conflicts of interest exist in any mass plaintiff representation, such conflicts ordinarily should
not prevent mass representation as long as the clients are aware of the conflicts and give their
informed consent.”).
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Divisions can also arise between lead lawyers who negotiate
the settlement and non-lead attorneys. Dealmakers are privy to the
settlement matrix and the confidential guidance document given to
the claims administrator, which explains qualifying criteria for
recovery.315 This knowledge allows leadership to tailor their own
clients’ claim submissions to maximize their payout (and the leader’s
contingent fees). Consider two examples:
First, in Biomet, settlement designers had an understanding
that if a claimant thought she was entitled to more than the
presumptive award, she could seek an enhancement through
mediation; after opening the file, however, Biomet could likewise seek
a reduction.316 Had the claimant accepted the presumptive award, the
file would remain “closed,” and Biomet would pay the presumed
award.317 But none of this was spelled out in the settlement itself.
Granted, nothing in the settlement contradicted the practice, so when
non-lead lawyers complained and requested interrogatories from lead
counsel, the judge took lead counsel’s word that the steering
committee tried to inform them and denied the discovery request.318
Second, in the Fosamax litigation, the judge permitted evidence
about claimants’ Fosamax use to come from either pharmacy records
or physician and dental records.319 But the settlement designers
limited proof to pharmacy records. In at least one client’s case, this
meant the difference between a $500 “category 1” claim and an
$80,000 “category 4” case.320 While trying to clarify the claimant’s
classification, Merck subjected the case to no less than three Lone Pine
orders as a prelude to requesting dismissal.321
To be sure, divisions routinely arise between claimants
competing for the same settlement money. But the concern lies in
ensuring that the settlement administration process is a fair one ex
ante. As such, claimants with structurally conflicting interests need
their own representative at the table when dealmakers negotiate and
formulate settlements.
315. E.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 051708 (DWF/AJB), 2009 WL 5195841, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009) (“[T]he Special Masters
would be guided by an allocation plan proposed by the PLCC [Plaintiff’s Lead Counsel
Committee] and approved by the Special Masters.”).
316. In re Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLMCAN (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2015) (case management order no. 3 at 2–3).
317. Id. at 3–4.
318. Id. at 4–5.
319. Osborn Law, P.C.’s Response to Merck’s Third Motion for a Lone Pine Order at 3, In re
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2014).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1.
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III. REGULATING THE MONOPOLY
One overarching theme emerges from analyzing the
settlements that repeat players design: the lead lawyers comprising
the monopolistic power have few reasons to discipline themselves, and
current circumstances render external checks ineffective. As repeat
players wield their cohesive interests to their own benefit, allowing
them to self-regulate can generate perverse results. As repeat actors
in powerful positions standardize and replicate practices that benefit
them and allow them to control others’ compensation, they further
insulate themselves from competitive market forces that might
otherwise disrupt self-dealing.
In many economic markets, monopolistic authority can lead to
higher prices and lower outputs. Here, the danger exists that
defendants will accede to provisions that enhance lead lawyers’
compensation in exchange for closure, less compensation for plaintiffs,
and reversionary clauses. Lower output could thus mean inadequate
representation through discounted payouts to claimants, stricter
evidentiary requirements, or more coercive participation measures.
Whether actual collusion exists or not, prophylactic regulation is
necessary to address the abundant opportunities for self-dealing.
Given the information barriers that prevent judges and clients
from monitoring leadership, however, regulation should incentivize
and leverage other plaintiffs’ attorneys to function as checks and
balances. Plaintiffs’ lawyers know all too well what happens behind
the scenes and how it affects them and their clients, but their payoff
for cooperating, staying silent, and playing the long game is currently
more profitable than competing.322 That profit calculation has to
change. Faithfully representing plaintiffs’ interests must be more
lucrative than falling in line and climbing the leadership ranks.
Judges have the power to appoint leaders and the power of the
purse.323 Common-benefit funds are judicially created, and should
likewise be judicially administered—not circumvented through
settlement’s backdoor or shielded by sealed fee petitions.324 And
322. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.4(a) (noting that oligopolistic market
structures can themselves produce a “ ‘consensus’ about how each firm can maximize its own
profits by tacitly participating in a strategy to maximize the joint profits of the group”).
323. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 2119,
2163–65 (2000).
324. See Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 134 (discussing how settlement negotiations
resulting in higher common-benefit fees harm non-lead attorneys and claimants). Settlements
that do anything more than simply subject the settling parties to the transferee judge’s fee
orders smack of self-dealing.
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though some scholars prefer to limit judicial involvement since judges
continually empower the same attorneys, heavily favor settlement,
ratify questionable settlement practices, and are repeat players too,325
most judges do care about achieving justice, but lack unbiased
guidance. Moreover, judges have welcomed training on how to
overcome their own biases in other contexts, demonstrating
receptiveness to critics and new methods.326 As such, educating judges
can be part of the solution. By implementing several changes, wellinformed judges can hold leaders accountable and instill competition
without legislative or rulemaking intervention, which allows for
further innovation and adaptation.
The first step is for judges to reject consensus slates for
appointing lead lawyers in favor of a competitive selection process that
permits attorneys to air objections confidentially to a special master.
Issuing an order that presumptively adds (or replaces) lead lawyers
with the attorney who successfully demonstrates an unaddressed
structural conflict of interest enhances the payoff for defecting,
prompts lead lawyers to be vigilant about whether conflicts exist, and
promotes fundamental due process through adequate representation.
The second step is for judges to compensate lead lawyers based
on a percentage of the benefit leaders actually confer on plaintiffs (as
opposed to a settlement fund’s inflated sticker price or a set
percentage of the fund). Tying fees to benefits instead of directly to
defendant’s closure goals realigns common-benefit fees with basic
contingent-fee principles: the better claimants fare, the better
leadership fares. Faithful representation should follow suit.
The third step is to invigorate competition through state courts
and calculated decentralization. By creating pricing packages for
state-court attorneys who want to access some (but not all) commonbenefit work, transferee judges can motivate state-court attorneys to
compete, develop claims under different states’ laws, and thus more
accurately price payouts under the settlement grid. Compensating
state lawyers whose work benefits all claimants using quantum
meruit principles encourages them to invest in developing their
325. E.g., id. at 169–74 (noting that judges lack incentives to ensure that common-benefit
work is done well and that existing practices compromise judicial independence by creating close
relationships with lead lawyers).
326. Terry A. Maroney, Why Choose? A Response to Rachlinski, Wistrich, & Guthrie’s “Heart
Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow their Feelings?,” 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
317, 318–19 (2015) (noting that judges routinely invite academics who reveal their cognitive
biases to them to conferences and concluding that “there is something deeply comforting in
recognizing judges’ humanity” and that “many judges enjoy—at least when among themselves—
being seen as they see themselves: ordinary people seeking to perform a difficult job consistently
and fairly, with variable levels of success”).

2017]

MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

137

cases—not to skimp in hopes of reducing a common-benefit tax’s
impact.
Remands also play a vital role. By issuing a standing order
indicating that they will suggest that the Panel remand non-settling
cases to their courts of origin after a global settlement, transferee
courts can employ market forces to discipline the leadership’s
monopoly power.327 Potential remands pressure lead lawyers to craft
settlements that cater to multiple injury types by dismembering their
consolidated power structure and thereby reducing non-consenting
plaintiffs’ accompanying common-benefit fees. Remands likewise
return plaintiffs’ most valuable bargaining chip: trial. When
combined, these proposals tap into the competitive rivalries within the
plaintiffs’ bar, inciting those who possess the most relevant
information and have the most at stake to police the monopoly.
A. Competing to Become the Monopoly: Leadership Selection Criteria
Consumers (legal clients included) tend to fare better in
competitive markets. When firms compete, they can distinguish
themselves based on price, expertise, and specialization.328
Competition serves as an antidote to cartelization and corruption,
incentivizes innovation, reduces prices, and encourages diversity.329
The economic and regulated industries literature provides some apt
analogies for incentivizing market checks on lead lawyers’
monopolistic power in a particular proceeding. Competing for the
market, that is, competing to become the monopoly, may produce some
of the same benefits of open-market competition.330
If practice proved as straightforward as theory, then there
would be no need for further regulation: competing to become a lead
lawyer would do all the work. Judges could simply trust the process.
But some of the economic criticisms of this theory are applicable here
too.331 One of the most salient is the idea that initial ex ante
competition for monopoly power may not adequately regulate ex post,

327. The Panel could likewise institute this change unilaterally by amending its own Rule
10.1. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
328. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2
(2005) (defining a competitive market as one of “low prices, high output, and maximum room for
innovation”).
329. SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 214–17 (2011).
330. Bailey, supra note 34, at 178.
331. DECKER, supra note 34, at 38–39.
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opportunistic behavior.332 Thus, there’s a need for judicial action as
well.
1. Competitive Selection Processes and Criteria
Although it’s more time intensive, judges need to employ truly
competitive processes in appointing lead lawyers—not rely on
consensus slates. Lawyers have little incentive to consider adequate
representation when brokering a consensus since representing more
people (even with conflicting interests) leads to higher fees and a
greater willingness to invest in the suit.333 Relying on self-selection
methods can encourage undisclosed fee-sharing arrangements that
may adversely affect settlement incentives,334 tit-for-tat reciprocity
among repeat players, and unrepresentative committees. In short,
consensus numbs the competitive forces that could erode repeat actors’
cartel-like power across multidistrict proceedings by allowing rivals to
enter the leadership ranks.335
As judges or special masters assume a more active role in
selecting leaders, what should they look for and how might they assess
those traits? While the sample leadership application and evaluation
forms in the Appendix provide a concrete starting point with specific
criteria, the goal—in contrast to the usual mantra of cooperation—is
to appoint a small, cognitively diverse group somewhat akin to a
“team of rivals.”336 Put simply, well-functioning decisionmaking
groups tend to have five to six members who are not like-minded.337

332. Id. at 39. Similar problems arise in private prison systems, for instance. E.g., James
Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96
YALE L.J. 353, 354–60 (1986).
333. Burch, supra note 22, at 121.
334. E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d,
818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving a plaintiffs’ management committee’s internal feesplitting agreement that would give financing attorneys three times the amount they advanced
to finance the litigation).
335. See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 10 (observing that dynamic competition can correct
inefficient markets by eliminating monopoly power).
336. As Cass Sunstein explains using a political example,
In the presidency of George W. Bush, many failures occurred because of an
unfortunate culture that encouraged, rather than combated, group polarization. . . .
By contrast, Lincoln’s presidency has been described as a healthy Team of Rivals, in
which Lincoln self-consciously chose diverse people who could challenge his
inclinations and test one another’s arguments in the interest of producing the most
sensible judgments.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 29–30.
337. While financing the suit may require leaders and steering committees to get buy in
from additional attorneys, empirical research suggests that “[g]roups containing 3 to 8 members
[are] significantly more productive and more developmentally advanced than groups with 9
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Just as teams of doctors need skeptics to make accurate diagnoses and
successful corporate boards require diverse, assertive members that
don’t kowtow to the CEO,338 leadership groups in multidistrict
litigation need members with mixed perspectives who are not afraid to
openly disagree. As Professor Cass Sunstein has argued, “In business
and in government, successful leaders seek divergent views and fresh
opinions”; “Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt are the foremost examples; they made special efforts to
ensure they did not live in echo chambers.”339
What is it that people with diverse perspectives contribute to a
group—and more importantly—to representation that a well-oiled
network of repeat players may not? Answering this crucial question
requires a very brief excursion into theory. There are certain patterns
that emerge and hold true across many contexts—ecosystems, political
elections, and economies, for instance. Here are two: (1) diversity
typically helps these systems function and contributes to innovation
and productivity; and (2) these systems need competition to flourish,
and diversity drives competition.340 So, it is unsurprising that studies
from a variety of scholarly disciplines indicate that cognitively
heterogeneous teams can outperform homogenous ones on disjunctive
tasks like identifying and cultivating successful legal arguments.341
People with varied perspectives and heuristics frame and solve
problems in different ways. When homogenous thinkers approach a
problem, they are likely to get stuck at the same point.342 But groups
with cognitively diverse members can employ different tricks or
reframe the problem in a way that allows the whole group to move
forward. They have different peaks, in other words. Over time,
members or more,” and productivity further increases in groups with five to six members. Susan
A. Wheelan, Group Size, Group Development, and Group Productivity, 40 SMALL GROUP RES.
247, 257–58 (2009).
338. SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 147–48; Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Boards Great,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/09/what-makes-great-boards-great
[https://perma.cc/4X9J-YMH5].
339. SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 83.
340. PAGE, supra note 329, at 8–9, 215–17.
341. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xiv–xv, 325–27 (paperback ed. 2007). As Scott Page
points out, “[m]ost real world tasks are neither purely disjunctive nor purely conjunctive[,]”
which is likewise true for the work of a plaintiffs’ steering committee. Id. at xv; Stefan SchulzHardt et al., Dissent as a Facilitator: Individual- and Group-Level Effects on Creativity and
Performance, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS
149, 150–54, 162–63 (Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Michele J. Gelfand eds., 2008); Gayle W. Hill,
Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N + 1 Heads Better than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL.
517, 533 (1982).
342. PAGE, supra note 341, at 157.
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however, cognitively diverse agents that interact frequently can lose
those differences; members’ thinking may converge, assimilate, and
become cohesive as the similarities among settlement practices
illustrate.343
Still, not all diversity is created equal. Unlike “identity”
diversity, which includes visible differences such as race, ethnicity,
age, gender, physical disabilities, and demographic dissimilarities,
“cognitive” diversity focuses on diverse knowledge and expertise
stemming from training, experiences, expertise and, yes, identity.344
While identity can play a role by creating experiential differences that
prompt contrasting analytic tools to develop, physical characteristics
alone may tell us little.345 For example, a Mexican American woman
raised in an upper class family who attends Harvard Law School may
have similar analytical tools and training as white males attending
the same school.346 As such, cognitive diversity can’t readily be
identified from someone’s appearance; training and life experiences
are traits that require understanding someone’s background.347
Judges should seek cognitively diverse members with varied
expertise and perspectives who will disclose privately held information
and dissent over matters that are relevant to the leadership’s
substantive tasks—not contrarians.348 Not all conflict is productive.
Appointing a group of malcontents who dislike one another is unlikely
to benefit anyone; relationship conflicts are detrimental to a group’s
longevity and performance, regardless of the type of task.349 These
interpersonal conflicts tend to distract group members from the job at
hand, prompting them to focus instead on threats, increasing their
own power, or cultivating their supporters.350 Process-oriented conflict
doesn’t fare much better. The more leaders’ opinions differ over the

343. Id. at 343.
344. Id. at 7–8, 302–12, 324–27; Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A
Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741 (1999);
Eden B. King et al., Conflict and Cooperation in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 261, 267–
68 (2009); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference?: The
Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 31, 41–42
(2005); Abby L. Mello & Lisa A. Delise, Cognitive Diversity to Team Outcomes: The Roles of
Cohesion and Conflict Management, 46 SMALL GROUP RES. 204, 205–07 (2015).
345. Mello & Delise, supra note 344, at 204–05.
346. PAGE, supra note 341, at 359.
347. Id. at 302–10.
348. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 84–85 (2003).
349. See Karen A. Jehn, A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of
Intragroup Conflict, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 256, 275–76 (1995).
350. Karen A. Jehn, A Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in
Organizational Groups, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530, 531 (1997).
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means for achieving their ends, the worse their performance.351 And
there is no need for conflict in conducting standardized, routine tasks
like reviewing discovery materials and producing documents.352
But conflict that centers on a non-routine task’s substance—
such as which legal theories are best suited for class certification, how
to argue against motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment, or how to structure a settlement—is beneficial, particularly
when coupled with norms that favor discussing substantive conflicts
and suppressing relationship conflicts.353 So, members with diverse
perspectives and expertise who make complex, non-routine decisions
can benefit from dissenting perspectives—those perspectives can
generate superior alternatives and yield new information.354 This
suggests that judges need to change the kind of information they
request, and focus on compiling a qualified group with mixed
experiences that complement one another. To aid in this endeavor, the
sample leadership form and applicant scoring sheet in the Appendix
provide straightforward information-gathering and assessment tools,
while the pocket guide for leadership appointments and compensation
explains best practices and cites to further reading for judges
interested in the theory.355
2. Permitting Confidential Objections to Special Masters
Current practices and norms reward silence, not dissent. When
judges require attorneys to openly object to proposed leaders,356 they
are unlikely to receive candid comments. Why? The conditions are ripe
for conformity and informational cascades: the relevant plaintiffs’ bar
is small and lead lawyers can influence and sometimes directly control
others’ attorneys’ fees.357 Passing a microphone in open court to solicit

351. See id. at 551.
352. See Jehn, supra note 349, at 260, 275–76 (explaining that task-related conflict can be
beneficial when the group’s assignment is complex and demands creativity and innovation, but
detrimental when assignments are routine).
353. See Jehn, supra note 350, at 551–52.
354. Jehn, supra note 349, at 260.
355. Infra apps. A3: Pocket Guide for Leadership Appointment and Compensation; A4:
Sample Leadership Application Form; A5: Leadership Applicant Scoring Sheet.
356. E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20,
2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting initial
conference).
357. See ELLICKSON, supra note 268, at 170–74 (discussing the role of sanctions for
objectors/defectors in close-knit groups who aim to maximize their own welfare); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 348, at 28–29, 68 (discussing the role of group identification and conformity). But see
Transcript of Proceedings at 49, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 4:13-md-02420-
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information from attorneys about one another is likely to lead to an
information cascade where group members withhold privately held
information, fall in line behind those asked first, and simply echo that
sentiment.358
Most objections occur nowhere within judicial earshot. Instead,
attorneys hash them out behind closed doors, oftentimes before a
power broker even convenes a leadership meeting.359 Presently, one of
several scenarios might unfold. First, if the challenger is powerful
enough, the presumptive leaders might offer the objector a position in
a concurrent or future multidistrict litigation. Second, if no deal is
struck and the challenger has allies backing her, then that alternative
group might present a competing slate or seek appointment alongside
the principal group.360 Finally, if the competitor is not well positioned,
then she must choose between capitulating or publicly opposing
attorneys who may be empowered.
Soliciting objections need not be so treacherous. The solution is
somewhat straightforward: appoint a special master to oversee
leadership selection. Lawyers can air their preferences and grievances
confidentially to the special master and perhaps the judge’s law
clerks.361 The clerks and the special master can speak privately with
the attorneys, assimilate and score the application forms, and then
recommend a slate to the judge.362 The judge can then treat the final

YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (claiming that if selected, the consensus group would not exclude
objectors from receiving work).
358. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 23–24, 68–69; SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 90–93.
359. When plaintiffs’ attorneys could not reach a consensus as to who would represent the
indirect purchasers in the LCD antitrust litigation, Dan Becnel noted, “I tried to—when we came
down here to—to have three, make a deal, and—and Mr. Berman decided not to. So the bulk of
us think Mr. Cotchett and the Cabraser firm are excellent.” Transcript of Proceedings at 51, In re
Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013); see
also Supplemental Objection of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr. to Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Fee Award,
Ex. B (Affidavit of the Becnel Law Firm, LLC as Per Order No. 6(D)) at 1, In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2011):
Numerous meetings were held in California, Texas, New York, Washington, D.C.,
Miami and New Orleans in an effort to organize this case for over a year prior to the
MDL. My office initiated many of these meetings and I undertook to have a consensus
built for electing leadership and for the sharing of information . . . .
360. Some judges have even requested that leadership applicants include lists of supporting
attorneys with their application. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (pretrial order no. 2:
applications for appointment of plaintiffs’ lead counsel and steering committee members at 2).
361. Judge David Proctor has used this procedure. See Special Master’s Rule 23 Report
Recommending Interim Plaintiff Leadership Counsel, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2013).
362. For detailed information on this interview and screening process as well as information
about application forms, see Burch, supra note 41, at 125–28.
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appointment as a confirmation hearing.363 Although this system may
enable attorneys to jockey for position by needlessly complaining
about one another, their reputations serve as one potential check. And
the additional costs are surely offset by adequate representation
gains.
3. Presumptive Appointments and Removals
Based on Structural Conflicts
Competing to become the monopoly through open selection and
allowing private objections improves the status quo, but does little to
ensure faithful representation or police opportunistic behavior
thereafter. As noted, even in diverse leadership groups, members’
cognitive differences may dissipate as they begin to identify with one
another.364 Group identity leads to trust, and trust enables members
to work together for their mutual gain.365 Just think about cartels: it’s
easier to collude with fewer players who have long-standing
relationships, communicate regularly, and use social norms to prevent
competitors from defecting.366 These traits should sound familiar by
now, for repeat players share them too. But whereas antitrust laws
disrupt cartels by creating distrust,367 no parallel currently exists in
multidistrict litigation.
Accordingly, the economic calculus must change such that the
payoff for raising inadequate-representation concerns is greater than
remaining complicit. If a leadership challenger successfully
demonstrates that a neglected structural conflict of interest exists and
that her appointment can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict,
the challenger has created a presumption that she should either serve
alongside or replace current leadership.368 Of course, since judges
often appoint lead lawyers early in the proceeding, information about
conflicts among claimants may not yet be available. As such, this
incentivizes leaders to address and remedy conflicts as they surface.
Structural conflicts present a high bar: they can arise either
between the claimants and the leadership or among the claimants
363. See, e.g., Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2013).
364. SUNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 28–29.
365. Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 311–12 (1992); Wheelan,
supra note 337, at 249–50.
366. Leslie, supra note 15, at 564–68, 579–81, 584–88, 590–91.
367. Id. at 622–36.
368. See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 287, 347–63 (2003) (proposing a similar solution in the class context).
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themselves, but must “present a significant risk” that leaders might
“skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of
their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the
lawyers themselves.”369 Pretrial efficiency may require placing
monopolistic control in the hands of a few attorneys, but with that
power comes the responsibility to act as fiduciaries for all claimants—
not just one’s individual clients.370 That is the very crux of structural
collusion—there need not be a backroom deal or conscious collusion.
The mere act of pursuing one’s own (and one’s clients’ own) selfinterest can lead to conflicted representation for non-clients.371
Allowing structural conflicts to persist without separate
representation violates basic due process rights in the class context,372
and, by extension, the multidistrict context.373 Multidistrict leadership
and steering committees have morphed from voluntary, ad hoc groups
into mandatory, judicially created ones.374 And multidistrict
proceedings share key traits with class actions: principal-agent
concerns, mandatory consolidation, judicially imposed organization,
judicially awarded common-benefit compensation, and a small cadre of
attorneys who owe fiduciary duties to all claimants while
monopolizing control and decisionmaking. Moreover, some global
settlements have adopted class-like characteristics such as walkaway
provisions and, in one case (the Yaz/Yasmin Gallbladder Settlement),
included an automatic-enrollment provision that required nonparticipating plaintiffs to affirmatively opt out, as they would in a
Rule 23(b)(3) class.375 As such, multidistrict litigation should afford
plaintiffs the same adequate representation protections.
Issuing a standing order that presumptively removes lead
lawyers who created or ignored structural conflicts of interest and
presumptively replaces leaders with the competing lawyers who
successfully demonstrated the conflict—so long as the challenger has
the requisite experience and available funding—can harness market

369. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
370. Id. § 1.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §10.22
(2004); Silver, supra note 170, at 1987–91.
371. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855 (1999).
372. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600, 606, 626–28 (1997).
373. Redish & Karaba, supra note 279, at 132–33.
374. For a historical overview of how these concerns have evolved as group organization
becomes increasingly formal and mandatory, see Burch, supra note 41, at 87–91.
375. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, § 1.01(A).
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forces to discipline the leadership’s monopoly power.376 If the entire
leadership has disserved claimants to advantage itself, then the judge
should clean house.377 Similarly, if some leaders structured the
settlement, negotiated side deals for their own clients, or litigated in a
way that systematically biases non-client claimants for reasons that
have no bearing on their claim’s strength,378 then the judge should
replace those attorneys—presumptively with the challenger
demonstrating the conflict.379 Alternatively, certain conflicts among
claimants suggest that the challenger should serve alongside current
leaders, not unseat them. If some clients have materially different
claims or circumstances such that unified representation would pose a
direct ex ante conflict (such as the conflict between those with present
and future claims in Amchem380), then judges should presumptively
add the challenger to the leadership roster to separately represent
those plaintiffs’ interests.381
B. Regulating Fees to Encourage Competition
and Fidelity to Claimants
Transforming leadership selection is only half of the puzzle.
Leadership’s fidelity to claimants must likewise be linked to their

376. See Nagareda, supra note 368, at 347–63. Sample language for this order is included
infra at app. A6: Sample Orders Suggesting Remand and Replacing Leaders.
377. The circumstances in Propulsid seem to provide one such example. See supra notes
104–123 and accompanying text.
378. The latecomer provisions in the DePuy ASR settlements provide one such example. See
supra notes 164–176 and accompanying text.
379. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2008) (“After Ortiz, such ‘side
settlements’ now seem to represent a per se ‘impermissible conflict of interest.’ ”); Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 385
(noting that courts should ensure against “structural allegiances of class counsel that would
create incentives to favor one part of the class over another, or be biased against seeking the best
possible return to a defined subset of claims”); Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing
Peter to Pay Paul: The Conflict of Interest Problem in Sibling Class Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1195, 1213–14 (2008) (noting that side deals give class counsel “great incentive” to reach
any settlement that may survive judicial scrutiny). Depending on the circumstances, when
competitors replace a current leader, the incumbent might still apply for common-benefit fees
based on the quantum meruit principles outlined below. Fees are more acceptable when the lead
lawyer recognizes the conflict in negotiating a side deal for her own clients and resigns from the
leadership.
380. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–28 (1997).
381. On the difference between ex ante and ex post conflicts created by the settlement itself,
see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1649, 1685–91 (2008).
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common-benefit fees.382 Awarding leaders a flat percentage of either
the claimants’ gross recovery or the fund’s sticker price does little to
promote faithful service. And reflexively imposing common-benefit
taxes on state-court litigants without some showing that those
claimants actually benefited from federal efforts stifles state-court
lawyers’ incentives to compete. Their rational response isn’t to expend
resources on case development, but to invest as little as possible to
profit when taxed through a global settlement. By contrast, using
quantum meruit principles to customize fee percentages based on the
benefit leadership actually bestowed better aligns lead lawyers’ and
claimants’ financial interests, empowers state courts as competitive
checks on overbearing deals, and irons out doctrinal wrinkles.
1. Compensate Leadership on a Quantum Meruit Basis
Judges and lead lawyers routinely invoke the common-fund
doctrine to justify awarding leadership’s fees. But common funds rest
on restitution principles and assume that class members, as passive
beneficiaries, implicitly consent to fee awards.383 That’s simply not the
case in multidistrict litigation; plaintiffs have their own attorneys and
have no choice but to accept and pay for lead lawyers’ judicially
appointed services.384
Lead lawyers also contend that courts should base their fees on
the total amount of the fund—claimed or not—and routinely cite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert as support.385
This overlooks a crucial distinction between the Boeing class and
multidistrict litigation: in Boeing, all class members had to do to
obtain their settlement money was prove they were class members,
which made them the “equitable owners” of their award;386

382. Fees drive strategy. See, e.g., Field, supra note 274 (accusing lead lawyers of foregoing
a stronger case for bellwether trial when the family’s attorney refused to pay lead lawyers half of
any attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff won).
383. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2011) (“The contingent nature of the class action fee—the fact that a fee is payable only in
the event of success, and then only by deduction from the recovery—obviates most of the
potential threat of forced exchange.”).
384. As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment makes plain: “By
comparison with class actions, court-imposed fees to appointed counsel in consolidated litigation
cannot be explained entirely by restitution principles, since litigants may have no choice but to
accept and pay for certain legal services as directed by the court.” Id.
385. 444 U.S. 472 (1980); e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of
Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 2–3, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012).
386. Boeing, 444 U.S. at 480–82.
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multidistrict litigation claimants are not automatically entitled to
their share—they must overcome evidentiary hurdles first.387
The unjust enrichment theory likewise shifts: Boeing class
members would receive a windfall if they failed to compensate class
counsel for helping them,388 but multidistrict litigation plaintiffs must
often surrender their right to sue in court in favor of the claimsadministration process before knowing whether they will recover.
While negotiating a no-hassle claims-resolution process that
compensates plaintiffs based on easily identified medical criteria is a
start, restitution principles still require a link between plaintiffs’
ultimate recovery and attorneys’ fees.389 Without that link, results like
those in Propulsid (where leadership’s fees—$27 million—grossly
outpaced claimants’ collective recovery—$6.5 million) are possible.390
The fear is the same one that animated changes to coupon
settlements: class counsel could exchange class members’ rights for
valueless coupons in return for hefty attorneys’ fees.391 After the Class
Action Fairness Act, federal courts must now calculate attorneys’ fees
based on the value of redeemed coupons.392
Common-benefit fees necessitate a similar shift. Without tying
fees to benefits, the danger exists that leadership might negotiate high
settlement amounts, use that inflated price to justify their fees, but
then capitulate to a defendant’s demands for stringent claimsresolution criteria, reversionary clauses, or both.393 Using quantum
meruit principles, however, deflates this premise.394 Quantum meruit
awards depend on a variety of factors, such as lead lawyers’
opportunity costs, financial risks, billing practices (whether hourly
billing or contingent fees), work, time spent,395 the case’s status, the
387. E.g., Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 2.
388. Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478.
389. See Burch, supra note 41, at 102–04; Silver, supra note 252, at 663–66.
390. See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text.
391. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29–30 (2005).
392. 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012).
393. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2010) (discussing issues with fees that are not tied to the actual value of class members’ claims).
394. Burch, supra note 41, at 128–35.
395. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974) (assessing
time spent on a case); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining specific services rendered); Richardson v. Parish
of Jefferson, 727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (considering attorney billing rate and hours
involved); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (considering an
attorney’s hourly billing rate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39
cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts is Different, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 448 (1998) (discussing “whether [a] lawyer is entitled to compensation
despite a violation of the lawyer’s duties to the client”).
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amount of work the individual plaintiffs’ chosen attorneys contributed
to the outcome,396 and—most importantly—the plaintiffs’ ultimate
success.
By their nature, quantum meruit awards typically entail
evaluating the results obtained and the objective benefit to the
client.397 As such, while judges might issue an initial order holding
back a portion of the settlement funds and award interim payments to
finance the litigation, before they award final common-benefit fees,
they should require parties to submit an accounting statement.398 This
final accounting should describe the benefits leaders conferred on
plaintiffs, how the settlement funds were allocated, the number of
plaintiffs who submitted claims, how many plaintiffs recovered in each
category or tier, and the average recovery amount in each category or
tier. Common-benefit fee awards should then be a percentage of
plaintiffs’ actual recovery, not the fund itself.399
Leadership has the burden of demonstrating that their efforts
benefitted claimants, making them more profitable than they would
have been without them. As such, where available, leaders should
likewise include information about settlement values and verdicts
obtained outside the multidistrict process as a comparative baseline.
The accounting should then be available to the plaintiffs and their
individual attorneys such that they can respond and object. This
information allows judges to fine tune fee awards according to
plaintiffs’ actual benefits and discourages attorneys from padding
their billable hours. For instance, because document review can
396. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c (AM.
LAW. INST. 2000) (“The standard rate or hourly fee might be modified by other factors bearing on
fairness, including success in the representation and whether the lawyer assumed part of the
risk of the client’s loss, as in a contingent-fee contract.”); Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee when
the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 392–93 (1992) (discussing
how the size of recovery is a factor used to determine attorneys’ fees).
397. See, e.g., 520 E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728,
739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d without op., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989) (“In determining the value of
an attorney’s services in quantum meruit, the following factors must be considered: 1. The
difficulty involved in the matters in which services were rendered; 2. The nature of the services;
3. The amount involved; 4. The professional standing of counsel; 5. The results obtained.”); In re
Hall, 415 B.R. 911, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 32, 35–36 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2005)):
Under quantum meruit, attorney fees are valued in light of the amount of the work
done and by the results obtained. The court must determine whether the client
received any benefit from the services and the value of the services rendered. Value is
determined in terms of value to the client.
398. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
(proposing a similar accounting for class counsel’s attorneys’ fees).
399. See Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767,
787–88 (2014) (proposing a similar adaptation for cy pres recoveries).
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generate billable time, law firms may be less likely to outsource
review to a cheaper legal process vendor that could perform the
service at less expense to plaintiffs.400 But subtracting and
reimbursing costs and then awarding lead lawyers a percentage of
plaintiffs’ actual recovery may encourage leaders to use vendors that
require only attorney supervision.401
Some circumstances should prompt judges to consider raising
or lowering the percentage awarded for common-benefit fees. For
example, meritorious objections from a particular tier of claimants
might prompt judges to lower the common-benefit percentage awarded
from that tier to better reflect the benefits conferred,402 and higher
settlements outside the multidistrict process might prompt judges to
lower the common-benefit percentage across the board.403 Similarly,
evaluating benefits on a tier-by-tier basis encourages attorneys to
maximize deterrence aims and value for “lower tier” claimants with
less severe injuries—whether through added compensation or
equitable or injunctive measures. This change incentivizes leaders to:
(1) streamline and simplify the claims process, (2) expedite payouts,
and (3) maximize the amounts (or equitable relief) paid to plaintiffs.
Put simply, leadership has to actually benefit plaintiffs to be paid.
Quantum meruit likewise allows judges to implement a
relatively novel theory of common detriment,404 where they subtract
money from a firm’s common-benefit fee if its attorneys disrupt and
delay the process without benefitting claimants.405 Judges have, for

400. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 587,
603–04 (2014) (discussing functions that nonlawyers can perform under attorney supervision,
such as work coding and searching discovery documents, but noting that paying attorneys more
for their time incentivizes them not to outsource work in a cost-effective manner).
401. Id.
402. Though contingent fees from their own clients will still incentivize leaders to maximize
payouts in particular tiers, ensuring adequate representation by appointing lawyers who
represent claimants across the spectrum should help mitigate those disadvantages.
403. Of course, there are many variables here. For example, some cases will inevitably have
stronger causation evidence and may not be representative of others, or state lawyers may have
relied on the multidistrict litigation’s common-work product to produce the results. The point,
however, is that higher settlements outside the consolidated litigation should trigger closer
judicial scrutiny.
404. E.g., In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (case management order no. 25 at 4); Special
Master’s Report and Recommendation on the Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and
Expenses at 5–7, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2014); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2009 WL 5195841, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009).
405. E.g., Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 12, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig.,
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example, used this theory to sanction attorneys who fail to disclose
claims-allocation plans to clients,406 hamper settlement payouts,
reduce settlement proceeds, or unjustifiably interfere with and delay
settlement negotiations.407 As such, the danger is obvious: courts must
take great care to distinguish between task-substantive conflict (even
if it fails to produce a tangible benefit) and relationship or processoriented conflict that might prove detrimental to the group.408 Failing
to appreciate those differences can dampen all conflict, leading once
again to an echo chamber.
Differentiating between dissenting behavior that improves
representation versus behavior that disserves the group and assessing
fees on a more granular level may necessitate appointing special
masters. Special masters can alleviate fears over financial sanctioning
and conflicting interests that arise when judges designate lawyer-led
fee allocation committees.409 And when they work with certified public
accountants, they can audit billing reports (on a monthly basis, for
instance) and spot billing outliers early on—not at the end when fee
fights may erupt.
2. Best Practices Can Empower State-Court Cases as
Competitive Checks
Quantum meruit can likewise recognize and compensate
competitive and complementary state-court efforts. As Part II.B.2
explained, lead lawyers have gone to great lengths to ensure that
state-court plaintiffs pay common-benefit fees if they have attorneys
with cases in the transferee court or want to participate in a master
settlement. On one hand, leaders’ concern is understandable: state
litigants may be freeriders who simply sit back and wait for leaders to
negotiate a deal. Avoiding common-benefit fees would unjustly enrich

No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014); In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis
Liab. Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 907, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
406. In re Guidant, 2009 WL 5195841, at *7–8.
407. In re Oral Sodium Phosphate Solution-Based Prods. Liab. Action, No. MDL 2066, 2010
WL 5058454, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2010) (memorandum and order).
408. Supra notes 348–354 and accompanying text (discussing differences among conflict
types).
409. E.g., In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala.
May 31, 2013) (order regarding protocols for plaintiffs’ counsel time and expense submissions)
(using a special master to compile and submit billing expenses on a monthly basis); see also In re
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. June 10, 2014) (order
regarding non-waiver of work product doctrine protection and attorney-client privilege as a
result of the submission of plaintiffs’ common benefit time and expense records to the special
master and the court).
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idle lawyers and their clients at the leadership’s expense.410 On the
other hand, significant verdicts routinely affect factually related cases
across the country, but those spillovers do not create compensable
benefits.
The main problem is that awarding a common-benefit
assessment of “X” percent is too blunt a tool. It doesn’t distinguish
between an attorney with all of her cases in the multidistrict
proceeding and one with twenty-five federal cases and four thousand
state-court suits. Nor does it adjust for the lawyer who has litigated
exclusively in state court without any help from the federal court’s
document repository and is ready for trial, but has clients who opt for
the global settlement. And it doesn’t increase fees for counsel who wait
for leaders to announce a settlement before dumping a bevy of cases
into the proceeding to cash in on others’ efforts. A flat tax thus
discourages attorneys from competing in state court where they might
form multiple centers of power that reveal additional information
about claims valuation. Nuance is necessary both to serve fairness
principles and to encourage state-court markets to function as rival
regimes.
If federal common-benefit fees discourage lawyers from
pushing state-court claims to trial, the status quo not only dampens
state courts’ use as a competitive check by raising rivals’ costs, it also
forestalls information from developing about claims’ diverse values.
States can differ over parties’ rights, and respecting those differences
is central to federalism.411 But settlements are expertly designed to
reduce outcome variance, and may thus provide less compensation to
claimants in states that permit idiosyncratic claims such as loss of
consortium, emotional distress, fear of disease, or medical
monitoring.412 States’ citizens will likewise have heterogeneous
preferences that can affect jury verdicts. Global settlements that
follow bellwether trials in the multidistrict proceeding simply cannot
recapture this variety with jurors from the transferee forum.

410. In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982
F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1992):
[W]hen a court consolidates a large number of cases, stony adherence to the American
rule invites a serious free-rider problem . . . . [E]ach attorney, rather than toiling for
the common good and bearing the cost alone, will have an incentive to rely on others
to do the needed work, letting those others bear all the costs of attaining the parties’
congruent goals.
411. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 579 (1996).
412. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 604, 628–29 (1997) (striking down
a settlement class action for failing to compensate claimants’ unique claims, among other
reasons).
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Consequently, settlements may substantially misprice certain
claims.413
Hewing common-benefit fees to quantum meruit principles
and, as the next Section details, automatically remanding non-settling
plaintiffs can eliminate barriers to competition and information
gathering. On the front end, if state-court litigants want to access
federal work product, then transferee judges should customize
participation agreements. While contract principles are ill suited for
attorneys litigating in the transferee court who have no choice but to
accept,414 tiered pricing packages (like digital photography bundles,
for example) would allow state-court attorneys to contract with the
federal leadership based on their document needs. Plaintiffs’ attorneys
often use sophisticated document repositories with unique login
information that enables leadership to track which documents have
been accessed and by whom.
On the back end, as some courts have done in the past,415
judges should award common-benefit fees to state-court counsel who
add value to the federal suit by objecting to practices that threaten
adequate representation or trying state-court cases, for example. This
encourages counsel to invest in state suits and can mobilize the
plaintiffs’ bar’s entrepreneurial power to develop state-specific
information that informs settlement awards.
C. Automatically Requesting Remand for Non-settling Plaintiffs
Jockeying to become the monopoly through competitive
selection processes, adding to and replacing plaintiffs’ leadership
based on structural conflicts, and customizing common-benefit fees
using quantum meruit principles collectively improve multidistrict
litigation by galvanizing competition. But these changes still lack one
key pressure point: the threat of trial in the face of an unsatisfactory
settlement offer. Often touted as the plaintiff’s most valuable
bargaining chip,416 multidistrict litigation eliminates that threat for

413. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 672 (2013).
414. Burch, supra note 41, at 104–08.
415. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 774 (E.D. La. 2011) (allocating
common-benefit fees).
416. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1379–80 (1995)) (noting that if a fairness
inquiry controlled class certification, counsel “would be disarmed” and, “confined to settlement
negotiations[,] could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer”); Erichson, supra
note 304, at 953, 958 (“[T]he litigation class action works as a tool of plaintiff empowerment.”).
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all but a few bellwether cases.417 In exchange, the process consolidates
the masses behind an autocratic leadership that may use settlement
to condition individual attorneys’ fees on surrendering the lawyer’s
entire clientele to the claims process, thereby tying plaintiffs’ financial
fates. That tie is particularly costly when claimants’ interests are nonuniform. Remand provides a vital alternative, particularly when nonsettled cases may languish in consolidated proceedings that no longer
benefit from consolidation. Accordingly, transferee judges should issue
a standing order indicating that they will automatically request that
the Panel remand non-settling plaintiffs to their court of origin after
leaders negotiate a master settlement.418 To achieve uniformity, the
Panel could institute this check unilaterally by simply amending its
own Rule 10.1(b).419
In addition to animating competition, automatic-remand
requests post-master settlement yield four crucial benefits. First, they
impart procedural justice to plaintiffs with unique claims that are
most likely to be disserved by a leadership that caters to the majority.
Remand allows those plaintiffs to pursue their suits in their chosen
fora if faced with an unsatisfactory settlement offer.420 It likewise
pressures lead lawyers to negotiate a favorable deal for claimants
across the spectrum, for leaders should not profit from people they do
not benefit.421 Second, if discovery has not neared completion before
settlement, then this should raise red flags about whether the
settlement value accurately reflects the claims’ merits, and suggest
that plaintiffs may be better served by conducting their own discovery
upon remand—not waiting for lead lawyers who have settled their
417. Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 123 (observing that the lack of trials “declaws
plaintiffs in transferred cases by depriving them of the weapon that pressures a defendant to pay
a reasonable amount in settlement: the threat of forcing an exchange at a price set by a jury”).
418. Although parties can request that the Panel remand cases, it never appears to have
done so without such a suggestion from the transferee court. Burch, supra note 95, at 418.
Sample language for issuing these orders is included infra Appendix A6: Sample Orders
Suggesting Remand and Replacing Leaders.
419. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 10.1(b), 277
F.R.D. 480 (2011).
420. This may affect counsel and plaintiffs’ decision of where to sue, for many of them
currently file directly in the transferee court after consolidation, which would weaken the threat
of remand. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 763 (2012). As Professor Bradt suggests,
one solution would be to require a plaintiff who files directly in the multidistrict proceeding to
declare an appropriate home court for remand purposes. Id. at 816.
421. Supra Part III.B.1 (discussing quantum meruit compensation principles); see also
Resnik et al., supra note 21, at 389–91 (“Regulation should not only provide a generic
admonition; it should also authorize judges to police those procedures by warning lawyers that
failure to meet these obligations could be grounds for disaggregation and could be relevant to the
payment of both costs and fees.”).
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cases to unselfishly fulfill their fiduciary obligations. Although some
efficiency may be lost, the gains in individual autonomy may be a
worthwhile trade at this stage.
Third, remanding cases to their transferor courts destabilizes
leadership’s power structure. Remand dislodges the omnipotence lead
lawyers exercise and vests control in individual counsel’s hands. It
also undermines the settlement vortex, which currently limits
plaintiffs to two choices: settle or risk dismissal. Remanding gives
them a third option—trial. By increasing available institutional
resources (judges and courts), remand destabilizes the monopoly and
can advantage plaintiffs with claims that may be undervalued by a
global settlement.422 As such, remand is a mixed bag for defendants:
Without a unified negotiating group that can deliver a wholesale deal,
they would have to bargain with individual attorneys and customize
settlements to reflect differences in state law and claim strength. But,
because weaker claims can no longer lurk within the masses, the total
number of plaintiffs may decline.
Finally, remanding cases to federal transferor courts and
allowing state-court cases to flourish at times can produce what
Professor Heather Gerken labels “second-order diversity.”423 Secondorder diversity is generated when many different kinds of groups
exist, but their members lack internal diversity. Ideologies and goals
differ across, but not within, the groups. While most of this Article has
espoused the need for first-order cognitive diversity and dissent within
lead lawyers’ decisionmaking groups, multidistrict litigation can also
benefit from allowing state-court judges and transferor judges to
innovate and experiment.424
CONCLUSION
While courts and legislatures may seek tipping points to
trigger change,425 the reality is that repeat attorneys in this elite bar
422. Galanter, supra note 30, at 36 (observing that increasing institutional facilities can
reduce advantages for repeat players, and would allow claimants to “litigate more and settle
less”).
423. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1172–73 (2005).
424. This is the basic thrust behind one line of the federalism literature arguing that state
courts should serve as laboratories. E.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85, 103
(1995); Burch, supra note 413, at 685–86; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders’ Design, 54 CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–99 (1987).
425. E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)–(b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Agenda Book, ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 39–
41 (Apr. 9–10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2015 [https://perma.cc/P23C-7V4A]; Jeffrey D. Koelemay,

2017]

MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

155

are adaptive, resilient, and likely to withstand these adjustments.
Thus, enhancing functionality within multidistrict litigation hinges
not on top-down rulemaking or external legislative reforms, but in
harnessing the power that already lies within the system itself:
competition. The plaintiffs’ bar is competitive and aggressive, but
judicial selection methods and deference to repeat players have
dampened open rivalry by rewarding cooperation. Dissenters are more
likely to be shunned and ostracized than rewarded, particularly if
their objections could derail a lucrative settlement. Consequently, the
question becomes how to implement adaptive adjustments that could
capitalize on competitive forces already in play, not how to coerce an
unlikely paradigm shift.
Accordingly, this Article draws from basic economic principles
to reinvigorate competition throughout the multidistrict proceeding.
At the outset, lawyers jockey to become the monopoly through
competitive selection processes. Allowing challengers to presumptively
join or replace leaders who fail to recognize and address structural
conflicts of interest incentivizes those boxed out of leadership roles to
police conflicts midstream. So, too, does enabling external state-court
competition. Carefully hewing to quantum meruit principles can
distinguish between compensable common benefits and noncompensable spillovers to justly tax state lawyers without deterring
them from developing and pursuing their own cases. After settlement
and beyond, tethering leadership’s common-benefit fees to the results
they actually obtain for particular claimants may require longer waits
or interim fee distributions, but it ultimately promotes fidelity in the
agency relationship. And if claimants are dissatisfied with the
settlement, giving them the freedom to return to their court of origin
for trial gives them bargaining leverage both inside the multidistrict
proceeding and with the defendant.
In sum, the point is not that repeat players are inherently bad,
but rather that their self interest can takeover if left unchecked—and
there is no check. When repeat players oligopolize most leadership
roles across multidistrict proceedings and then exercise monopolistic
control over plaintiffs’ claims in a single proceeding, that dominance
needs balance. Without counterweights and accountability, the line
between deals that claimants can’t refuse because they are simply too
good to pass up and those they can’t refuse in The Godfather sense
gets pushed further into Corleone territory.

Bill to Curb Class Suits Clears Committee; Civil Rights Plaintiffs Thrown a Bone, Class Action
Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 718 (June 24, 2015).
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TABLE A1: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS OCCURRING
WITHIN THE DATASET

1355
1431
1657
1742
1836
1909
1845
1763
1871
2004
1928
1967
1873
1842
1953
2188
2179
2308
2023
1507
2047
1958
2284
1943
2223

Asbestos
Factor VII or IX Concentrate
Blood Prods.
Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine)
Propulsid
Baycol
Vioxx
Ortho Evra
Mirapex
Gadolinium Contrast Dyes
ConAgra Peanut Butter
Human Tissue
Avandia
Mentor Corp. ObTape
Trasylol
Bisphenol-A Polycarbonate
Plastic
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch
Heparin
Apple iPhone 4 Marketing &
Sales Practices
Deepwater Horizon
Sketchers Toning Shoe
Bayer Corp. Combination
Aspirin
Prempro
Chinese Drywall
Zurn Pex Plumbing
Imprelis Herbicide
Levaquin
Navistar Diesel Engine

Publicly
Available

1203

MDL Name

Class-Action
Settlement

875
986

First
Settlement
Date

MDL
Number

Consolidation
Date

The following table includes the aggregate settlements that
occurred as of July 15, 2016, for the seventy-three products-liability
and sales practice cases that were pending on the Multidistrict
Litigation Docket as of May of 2013.426 The settlements reviewed for
this Article are indicated in bold.

7/29/91
12/7/1993

1980s
5/8/1997

No
Yes

No
Yes

1/6/1998

1/3/2002

Yes

Yes

8/7/2000
12/18/01
2/16/2005
3/1/2006
6/22/2007
2/29/2008
6/17/2007
6/13/2007
6/11/07
12/3/08
4/7/2008
8/13/2008

4/30/2004
6/30/2005
11/9/2007
10/13/2008
2/29/2009
4/15/2009
5/29/2009
1/30/2010
6/1/2010
6/8/2010
7/6/2010
1/3/2011

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

10/24/2007
6/22/2007
6/6/2008
10/8/2010

3/14/2011
7/1/2011
12/1/2011
1/1/2012

Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

8/10/2010
12/19/2011
4/14/2009

4/18/2012
5/02/2012
5/16/2012

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

3/4/2003
1/13/2010
8/21/2008
10/20/2011
6/13/2008
4/13/2011

6/8/2012
6/14/2012
10/15/2012
10/19/2012
10/30/2012
11/1/2012

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

426. A full list of cases included in the database appears in Burch & Williams, supra note 43
(manuscript at Appendix).

2372
2233
2197
1789
2325
2008
2391
1964
1629
2385
2387
2333
2419
2283
2327
2299
2187
2326
2316
2327
2158
2100

Toyota Motor Corp.
Unintended Acceleration
Chantix (Varenicline)
Yasmin & Yaz
(Drospirenone)
Watson Fentanyl Patch
Porsche Plastic Coolant
Tubes
DePuy ASR Hip Implant
Fosamax
American Medical
Systems
Land Rover LR3 Tire Wear
Biomet Magnum Hip
Implant
NuvaRing
Neurontin
Pradaxa
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic
Support Sys.
MI Windows & Doors
New England Compounding
Pharmacy
Building Materials Corp. of
Am.
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair
Actos (Pioglitazone)
C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys.
Boston Scientific Corp. Pelvic
Repair Sys.
Ford Motor Co. Spark Plug &
3-Valve Engine
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys.
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
Whirlpool Corp. Front
Loading Washer

Publicly
Available

2092
2100

MDL Name

Class-Action
Settlement

2151

157

First
Settlement
Date

MDL
Number
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4/9/2010

12/26/2012

Yes

Yes

10/1/2009
10/1/2009

1/15/2013
3/15/2013

No
No

No
Yes

8/7/2012
5/23/2011

6/4/2013
7/26/2013

No
Yes

No
Yes

12/3/2010
11/21/2011
2/7/2012

11/11/2013
12/9/2013
4/30/2013

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Semi427

2/23/2009
10/2/2012

5/30/2013
1/31/2014

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

8/22/2008
10/26/2004
8/8/2012
8/6/2012

2/7/2014
5/30/2014
8/13/2014
9/22/2014

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

4/23/2012
2/12/2013

12/24/2014
2/13/2015

Yes
Bankr.428

Yes
Yes

10/11/2011

4/22/2015

Yes

Yes

2/7/2012
12/29/2011
10/12/2010

3/10/2015
4/29/2015
6/23/2015

No
No
No

No
Yes
No

2/7/2012

12/7/2015

No

No

2/8/2012

1/26/2016

Yes

Yes

2/7/2012

1/27/2016

No

No

9/9/2010
12/20/2008

2/11/2016
5/11/2016

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

427 This settlement was included as an exhibit to a Securities and Exchange Commission
filing; some confidential parts of it were redacted. Endo Health Sols., Inc., Master Settlement
Agreement (Form 8-K EX-10.144) (Aug. 6, 2013). The agreement is between American Medical
Systems and Freese & Goss, PLLC and Matthews & Associates. Id.
428 New England Compounding Pharmacy is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, so
the settlement is a bankruptcy trust. In re New Eng. Compounding Pharmacy, Inc., 544 B.R.
724, 733 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016).
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TABLE A2: REPEAT PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS’ PARTICIPATION
IN NON-CLASS SETTLEMENTS

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup

No

American Medical
Systems

NuvaRing

Yes

Actos

Biomet

Yes

Fosamax (1789)

Vioxx

18

DePuy ASR

Propulsid

21

Yasmin/Yaz

Total No. MDL
Appearances

Attorney
Arsenault,
Richard
Seeger,
Christopher
Nast, Dianne
Becnel, Jr.,
Daniel
Parker,
Jerrold
Robinson, Jr.,
Mark
Conroy, Jayne
Parfitt,
Michelle
Levin, Arnold
London,
Michael
Thompson III,
Fred
Lanier, W.
Mark
Shkolnik,
Hunter
Crump,
Martin
Restaino,
John
Cartmell,
Thomas
Flowers, Peter
DeBartolomeo,
A.J.
Flaherty,
Yvonne
Osborne,
Joseph
Dugan, II,
James
Matthews,
David
Meadow,
Richard

Total No. Leadership
Appearances

The following table includes a list of the highest level repeat
player plaintiffs’ attorneys (based on their number of appearances
within the dataset) and whether they participated in any of the nine
multidistrict proceedings that resulted in a publicly available nonclass settlement.

Yes

Yes

No

21

16

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

19

14

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

14

14

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

11

11

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

14

10

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

12

10

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

11

10

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

15

9

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

14

9

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

12

8

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

11

8

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

9

8

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

8

8

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

10

7

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

8

7

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

8

7

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

7

7

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

7

7

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

7

7

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

7

7

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

7

7

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

7

7

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No
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Zimmer Durom Hip
Cup

No

No

No

No

9

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

7

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

7

6

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Actos

No

NuvaRing

No

Biomet

No

Fosamax (1789)

No

DePuy ASR

Yes

Yasmin/Yaz

No

Vioxx

6

Propulsid

American Medical
Systems

159

10

Total No. MDL
Appearances

Attorney
Cabraser,
Elizabeth
Aylstock,
Bryan
Zonies, Joseph
Anapol,
Thomas
Salim, Robert
Abrams,
Rachel
Blizzard,
Edward
Oliver, Alyson
Monsour,
Doug
Climaco, John
Placitella,
Christopher
Garrard, III,
Henry
Denton, Roger

Total No. Leadership
Appearances

2017]

7

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

6

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

6

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

6

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

6

6

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

11

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

9

5

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Chaffin, Eric

7

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Love, Scott

7

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Potts, Derek
Burnett, Jr.,
Riley

7

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Mueller, Mark
Alonso,
Andres
Clarke,
Clayton

6

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

5

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

6

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Grand, Jeff
Papantonio, J.
Michael

6

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

6

5

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Barrios, Dawn
Copeland,
Erin
Goetz,
Michael

6

5

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Hauer, Stacy
Maniatis,
Victoria
Miller,
Michael
Robins, III,
Bill
Saunders,
Joseph

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

5

5

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Skikos, Steven

6

4

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Bell, Harry

5

4

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No
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A3: POCKET GUIDE FOR LEADERSHIP APPOINTMENT
AND COMPENSATION
Timing of Appointments (Interim and Semi-permanent Leaders):
 Appoint interim leaders to serve until conflicts of interest can
be identified.429
Required Disclosures:
 All financing arrangements (between attorneys, banks,
financiers, etc.) should be disclosed in camera to the judge or
special master.430
Selection Process:
 Open, written application process with no presumption toward
reappointing interim counsel. Appendix A4 includes a sample
leadership application form,431 and A5 contains a scoring sheet.
 Allow applicants to air objections confidentially to a special
master and judicial clerks through their applications and
evidentiary hearings.432
Selection Criteria and Goals:
 Aim to appoint no more than five to six leaders to serve on the
steering committee (this number includes lead counsel).433
 Seek qualified attorneys with diverse training and expertise
who will be willing to dissent over non-routine, substantive
tasks.434
 Consider applicants’ willingness to seek competitive bids from
complex settlement administrators who facilitate data
management, lien resolution, and claims administration as
well as their willingness to make those payments and costs
transparent to other plaintiffs’ attorneys.
 Ensure that claimants with structural conflicts have separate
representation on the leadership committee435 and that,
collectively, leaders can finance the litigation.436
429. Burch, supra note 41, at 125–26.
430. E.g., In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 28, 2013) (order appointing plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and inviting applications for plaintiffs’
leadership committee positions). For additional information, see Burch, supra note 29, at 1331–
32; Burch, supra note 41, at 123–25.
431. See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of competitive selection processes and criteria.
432. Burch, supra note 41, at 126; supra Part III.A.2.
433. Supra note 337 and accompanying text.
434. Supra Part III.A.1.
435. Burch, supra note 41, at 122–23; supra Part II.D.2 (discussing concerns of adequate
representation); supra Part III.A.3 (appointing and removing leaders based on structural
conflicts).
436. Burch, supra note 41, at 123–25.
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Adding or Replacing Leaders:
 If a leadership challenger successfully demonstrates that a
neglected structural conflict exists and that her appointment
can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict, the challenger
has created a presumption that she should either serve
alongside or replace current leadership.437 Sample language for
such an order is included in Appendix A6.
Common Benefit Assessment:
 Common-benefit orders should designate presumptive holdback
amounts and make clear that all final common-benefit fee
awards shall be judicially allocated on a quantum meruit basis
that ties fees to the amounts actually awarded to claimants.438
Percentages awarded should be calculated on the gross
amounts awarded to plaintiffs after subtracting costs. Judges
(or special masters) might place claimants or lawyers into
various presumptive fee categories to aid in this task.
 Consider pricing packages for state litigants who want to
access some, but not all, federal work product.439
 Pay common-benefit awards to attorneys litigating in state
court who confer benefits on multidistrict plaintiffs (through
significant trial victories, for example).440
 If lead lawyers abuse their fiduciary duties toward certain
claimants, those claimants should not pay common-benefit
fees.441
 Common-benefit orders should not escalate fee and cost
assessments based on the timing of plaintiffs’ attorneys consent
to the assessment.442
 Because common-benefit funds are judicially created, they
should be judicially awarded. Attempts to contract around
orders via a master settlement agreement should be viewed
with careful attention to the incentives that animated the
agreements and to attorneys’ ethical obligations.
 Fee-transfer agreements are inappropriate for attorneys with
cases pending in the multidistrict proceeding, but may be used
437. Supra Part III.A.3.
438. Burch, supra note 41, at 128–35; supra Part III.B.1.
439. Supra Part III.B.2.
440. Supra Part III.B.2.
441. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999) (holding that “a client need not prove
actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an attorney’s fee for the attorney’s breach of
fiduciary duty to the client”); supra notes 164–182 and accompanying text (discussing latecomer
provisions).
442. Supra Part II.B.1.
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to tailor pricing packages for state-court attorneys who want to
access some but not all of the leadership’s work product.443
Automatic Suggestion of Remand:
 Issue a standing order as part of the initial case management
order indicating the court will suggest that the Panel remand
non-settling cases to their courts of origin after a master
settlement.444 Sample language is included in Appendix A6.
A4: SAMPLE LEADERSHIP APPLICATION FORM445
Applications for leadership positions should respond to each of
the following questions by [date]. The information provided will be
submitted in camera for confidential review by the judge or appointed
special master.
1. Using the template below, please provide a summary list of all
multidistrict litigations in which you or your law firm have had
involved clients in the past five years (an example follows).
Include:
a. the multidistrict litigation’s subject matter (products
liability, antitrust, etc.);
b. whether you held a leadership role (plaintiffs’ steering
committee, discovery committee, etc.), and, if so, your
position;
c. whether others in your firm held a leadership role;
d. which of those multidistrict litigations are currently
ongoing (please include these at the top of the list);
e. for the litigations that have been resolved through a
non-class master settlement agreement, indicate the
average award paid to claimants (in each category, if
applicable) if known, what percentage of your firm’s
clients agreed to the settlement, and what percentage of
those clients recovered money through the claims
process;
f. and, if you or your firm served in a leadership role, the
final percentage of the common-benefit fund lead
lawyers requested for fees and costs, what percentage
the court awarded, and the amounts awarded to your
firm for fees and costs.

443. Burch, supra note 41, at 106–09; supra Part III.B.2.
444. Supra Part III.C.
445. Details explaining the rationales behind this form can be found in Burch, supra note
41, at 120–28.
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MDL
Number
and
Status

Subject
Matter

Leadership
Role

Non-class Master
Settlement Outcomes

Final
CommonBenefit fee

16-md00001
(ongoing)

Products
liability

 Personal
(discovery
committee)
 Firm (PSC

 Yes, resolved through
master settlement.
$4000/category A
claimants;
$6000/category B
claimants
 80% of firm clients
settled
 98% of those settling
clients recovered money

 6% fee and
2% costs
requested
 4% fee and
2% costs
awarded
 Total amount
of fees and
costs received
by your firm

appointment)

2. To the extent that you have subject matter expertise or
experience handling mass actions that is not reflected in your
response to number 1, please describe it briefly in no more than
one page. Your response should highlight organization, writing,
communication, leadership, and deposition skills.
3. Please identify any structural conflicts446 that currently exist
between plaintiffs or are likely to arise during the course of the
litigation.
4. Please list the injuries and claims alleged by all your current
clients (whether in state or federal court) and their states of
domicile.
5. Please explain how you plan to finance the suit and disclose (in
camera) any and all financial arrangements that you have
made or anticipate making to fund your firm’s financial
contribution to this suit, whether between plaintiffs’ attorneys,
banks, vendors, or third-party financiers.
6. Please disclose any and all relationships with third-party
vendors and any pricing structures or proposals that those
vendors can provide for managing pleadings, discovery,
documents, and claims processes in a cost-effective way.
7. Is there anyone with involved clients with whom you would
prefer not to work if selected for a leadership role? If so, please
explain.

446. That is, a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would
represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would
present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct
of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers
themselves.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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8. Is there anyone whom you feel would be particularly good in a
given role? If so, please explain.
Note that numbers 7 and 8 can be answered orally in confidential
meetings with the special master.
A5: LEADERSHIP APPLICANT SCORING SHEET
Substantial research suggests that certain selection methods
can decorrelate error and overcome decisionmaking biases, such as the
halo effect, by compiling information from multiple, independent
evidentiary sources.447 As such, this form is designed for special
masters, judicial clerks, and judicial assistants to use in evaluating
leadership application forms (the diversity of perspectives enhances
accuracy).
Instructions:
To avoid influencing one another and spreading biases, scorers
should independently review the applications, collectively meet with
the applicants, and allow them opportunities to confidentially object to
one another, and then, before discussing them, independently rate the
applicant’s following traits on a scale of 1 (very weak) to 5 (very
strong). Scorers should rate each trait sequentially. After all traits are
scored for all candidates, scores should be tabulated.448 Candidates
with the highest scores should comprise the presumptive slate, though
subsequent discussion may affect the selection of those with ties or
scores at the margin. Judges can then make any necessary
adjustments or substitutions to address conflicts of interest.449
Applicant’s Name: ___________________
____ (a) Organization skills
____ (b) Leadership or negotiation skills
____ (c) Writing and deposition skills (or willingness to delegate to
skilled others)

447. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 84–85 (2011).
448. Time and again, research suggests “to maximize predictive accuracy, final decisions
should be left to formulas, especially in low-validity environments”—not experts. Id. at 225–26.
Simple formulas that assign equal weights to all relevant predictors using common sense “are
often very good predictors of significant outcomes.” Id. at 226.
449. For an overview of Daniel Kahneman’s research in this area, see Gus Lubin, Nobel
Laureate Says There’s a Better Way to Make Hiring Decisions, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 9, 2013,
12:23
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/daniel-kahneman-on-hiring-decisions-2013-1
[https://perma.cc/67E8-XFJE].
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____ (d) Likelihood of dissenting or objecting as to how other leaders
perform substantive tasks (e.g., crafting legal arguments, structuring
settlements)
____ (e) Dedication to client outcomes
____ (f) Financing ability
____ (g) Cognitive diversity (unique but relevant experiences, skills,
analytical tools)
____ (h) Close your eyes. Try to imagine the applicant in a leadership
position, and assign a score on a scale of 1 (weak) to 5 (strong).
_____ Sum
A6: SAMPLE ORDERS SUGGESTING REMAND
AND REPLACING LEADERS
As part of the initial case management order, judges might include the
following additional language:
ADDITIONS TO OR REPLACEMENT OF PLANTIFFS’
LEADERSHIP—The Court intends to appoint a Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee(s) and Lead Counsel to conduct and coordinate pretrial
litigation. As part of the leadership application process, the Court has
requested applicants to identify known structural conflicts of interest.
Plaintiffs’ leadership owes a fiduciary duty to all plaintiffs in this
proceeding. Thus, if after the appointment an attorney successfully
demonstrates that a neglected structural conflict450 exists and that her
appointment can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict, the
challenger has created a presumption that she should either serve
alongside or replace current leadership. Should challengers replace a
current leader, the incumbent might still apply for common-benefit
fees based on quantum meruit principles.
SUGGESTION OF REMAND—Should the parties reach a master
settlement, the Court will automatically suggest that the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation remand non-settling civil actions
transferred to this Court for consolidated pretrial purposes that have
provided basic evidentiary information about their claim. If a master
settlement occurs, the Court will, without motion from the parties,
450. That is, a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would
represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would
present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct
of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers
themselves.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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issue a suggestion of remand that includes an appendix of cases to be
remanded to the indicated transferor courts. At that time, if counsel
believes that an error has been made in the Appendix, they should
notify the Court in writing within fourteen (14) days of that
Suggestion of Remand so that this Court, if persuaded by the asserted
error, can notify the Panel.

